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The Multiplication of Fractional
Elk-New Mexico's New Math
They paint a bleak picture of an ecosystem literally unraveling,
as stream banks erode, woody shrubs disappear, stands of
aspen and willows die, and many once abundant species from
beaver to birds dwindle. The culprit they point to is elk.
I. Introduction
In 1989, the New Mexico State Game Commission (SGC) and
Department of Game and Fish (DGF) promulgated the first of a new
generation of regulations governing private landowner permits for
hunting elk.' These regulations proposed to provide compensation to
landowners for elk that invade and destroy their private property. With
modifications, the DGF re-promulgated that original regulation in 1995
as 19 New Mexico Administrative Code (N.M.A.C.) 30.5 (1995), Private
Land Elk License Allocation." The regulation requires landowners to
demonstrate elk depredations, and once shown, allows the landowner
access to a permit distribution systemI Within that allocation system, the
landowner receives permits based on several considerations, such as
desired elk herd size, previous years' hunting successes within the Game
Management Unit and the size of the ranch.6 These permits allow the
bearer to claim elk licenses from the DGF for use during the subsequent
hunting season.'
New Mexico, through its Department of Game and Fish, required
the regulation because elk can cause substantial damage to private

1. Steven Budiansky, Yellowstone Unraveling,U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 16,
1996, at 80.

2. Establishing a System for Allocating Elk Licenses on Private Lands and Public
Lands Within Game Management Units, Regulation No. 667 (Dep't of Game and Fish, State

Game Comm'n, July 28, 1989) [hereinafter Regulation No. 667.
3. Santiago R. Gonzales, Access System for PrivateLand in New Mexico, TRANS. 54TH N.
A. WILDL & NAT. Ri CON. 179, 179 (1989).

4. Compare19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, Private Land Elk License Allocation (N.M. Dep't of Game
and Fish, State Game Comm'n, Apr. 1, 1995); Amendment No. I to Regulation No. 667,
Establishing a System for Allocating Elk Licenses on Private and Public Lands Within Game
Management Units, Order No. 3-92 (N.M. Dept. of Game and Fish, State Game Comm'n,
May 20, 1992) [hereinafter Amendment I of Regulation No. 6671.

5. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7.7 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.5.1 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 §
9.1 (1995).
6. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7-8 (1995).
7. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.1 (1995).
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landowners' property and because of continuing interest in expanding the
population of elk in the state.' Rather than "tooth and claw" depredations caused by large carnivores, elk cause "displacement" depredations.9
Because elk compete with other ruminants for the same forage in the
same habitat, elk can damage the economic viability of private lands."0
The regulation intended to compensate landowners for this displacement
and for physical damage to property." However, the compensation to
landowners is indirect and imprecise because the DGF does not match
the compensation to the depredations, but only matches the quantity of
permits allocated to the depredations. 2 Landowners must market the
permits to receive. the intended compensation, which leaves the actual
compensation variable and inconsistent with the damage inflicted by
elk.13
The current regulatory system provides variable compensation to
different classes of landowners. When the public statements by the
Department of Game and Fish evince a purpose to provide compensation
to all landowners suffering depredations, the regulation fails this purpose
because the permitting process does not guarantee all landowners
compensation. 14 As discussed below, assuming parity of hunting
services and access provided to the hunter, small-acreage landowners
receive less compensation per damage suffered than do large-acreage

8. See Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179-80.
9. Displacement depredations are damages that herbivorous wildlife does to privately
owned personal or real property. Larger carnivores destroy domesticated animals, wild
herbivores destroy domesticated animals by consuming feed or grasses grown to supply
them with food during long pasturages. See, e.g. WYo. SrAT. § 23-1-901 (Michie 1977) which
provides that damages from depredations include the following: "livestock damaged or
killed by a trophy game animal, the damaged land, growing cultivated crops, stored crops,
seed crops, improvements and extraordinary damage to grass.' See also CoLO.REv. STAT.
ANN. § 33-3-201 which the Colorado Legislature amended in 1993 to include the following
finding:
(a) Large-scale damage to the property of individual landowners by
wildlife, particularly elk, is an increasingly common occurrence throughout
Colorado;
(b) While instances of such damage may be isolated, each can cause
significant and potentially devastating consequences to the landowner

involved ...
10. Id.
11. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179.
12. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.5.1 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.5.3 (1995).

13. See generallyGonzales, supranote 3; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-14.1 (Michie 1978); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 17-1-14 (Michie 1978).
14. See Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179. This paper focuses on this failure to achieve the
self-ascribed purpose of the regulation. This is not the only purpose of the regulation, and

it is not the intention of the author to suggest that the regulation fails these additional
purposes.
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landowners.'5 The purposes defined for the regulations by DGF statements and by state statutes do not appear to support this variable
compensation. 6 The failure to conform with these statements forms one
cornerstone of the suggestions made in the proposed statute contained in
Appendix A.
Additionally, the regulation is an inefficient allocation of wildlife
resources because it shifts administrative costs to the landowner. 7 This
shift burdens small landowners by forcing them into competition with
large landowners: we must halt this shift because it ensures that small
landowners cannot receive fair compensation for their losses. This
comment will discuss regulatory options and recommend statutory
authorization for a comprehensive administrative system. Section II will
describe the process under the current regulatory system. Section III will
discuss the shortcomings of this regulatory procedure. These shortcomings include both internal and external difficulties; Section III discusses
both. Finally, Section IV will outline the recommended changes-to the
regulatory and statutory structure.

II. A CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF COMPENSATORY ELK
PERMITS
Compensatory permits for elk hunting possess a long history in
New Mexico statutory and administrative law. Understanding New
Mexico decisionmaking in the context of other regulatory options and in
the context of colonization of the New World provides special insight into
the purposes of the regulations. This section discusses 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5
and its position in the development of elk regulation in New Mexico.
Subsection A describes the history and purposes of wildlife regulation,
referring to both English legal doctrines and purposes and New World

15. For the purposes of this discussion, the upper limit for "small-acreage" ranches is
160 acres. Anything larger is a "large-acreage" ranch.
16. See Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180. Gonzales' discussion of the regulatory framework
does not distinguish between the effects on various sizes of ranches. Similarly, Gonzales
identifies the public trust responsibilities the DGF has when it manages wildlife for the
citizens of the state. Id. at 181. Gonzales does not differentiate between the public trust
duties associated with management and disposal of wildlife. Id. It is unclear that the DGF
could do so. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1 (Michie 1978) (putting equal burdens on the
Department of Game and Fish to "provide and maintain an adequate supply of game and
fish within the state of New Mexico," in both use and development, while serving the dual
purposes of "public recreation" and ensuring "food supplies.").
17. Gonzales states that "Illandowners market authorizations through access privileges
by direct sales to hunters, or leasing those privileges to guides or outfitters. Accommodations range from full to self-service of any kind. Market value is based on the level of
services, amount or type of game and ranch reputation." Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180.
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purposes, analyses, and developments. Subsection B first discusses the
history of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 and recent changes made to it in the 1995
promulgation. Next, it outlines the statutory bases for the regulation. Finally, it discusses the current regulatory procedure for acquiring,
transferring, and using landowner elk permits and licenses.
A. A Context of Wildlife Management Practices and Legal Principles
The recent interest in compensation for injury to private land by
wildlife represents a partial swing toward recognizing a landowner's
right in wildlife on private land. This recognition stands independent of
historic practices. Before the colonization of the New World, English
game laws served a variety of purposes, but few were egalitarian.18
Many purposes related to hunt management by exclusion of segments of
society. Managing hunts provided for predictable herd sizes, and thus,
predictable takes. 9 Similarly, restrictions on hunting provided restrictions on possession of arms which provided more predictable security for
the landed aristocracy.'0 A group forbidden to hunt could not use that
as an excuse to participate in robbery, revolution, or conspiracy.2 1
Equally, English laws provided class-based restrictions on game by using
a "qualifications system" that made wealth or title a prerequisite for
hunting.' These restrictions sufficed in England because the wildlife
was not essential for survival. When colonists arrived in the New World,
they allocated rights in game to monopolies and to the public at large to
assure a food supply.'
The colonists made this allocation, in part, because of need, and
in part because enforcement of game laws was impossible. Further, the
landed citizens often faced the same survival problems as less-well-off
citizens. The landed elite, without a steady supply of game, could not
guarantee their own survival. They could not guarantee the supply of
game unless any individual felt free to take game.' Because many
colonists fled England for the New World seeking new opportunities and
liberties, colonists often came to view class-based restrictions on the tak-

18. THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WrLDUwE LAw 3 (1980).
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 5-6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 8-9.
23. LUND, supra note 18, at 19-20.
24. Id. at 29-30.
25. See id. at 20, stating that "The rest of America's hunters had to come from the ranks
of farmers, woodcutters, and such when they had freedom in the seasonal rhythm of their
work, or when they serendipitously chanced upon wildlife."
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ing of game as a product of tyranny.' This view supported limitations
on a landowner's right to exclude hunters from their property when the
landowner did not develop the land.? As the colonial villages and
towns became cities, restrictions on hunting became necessary for public
health and safety reasons.
Late in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of the United
States began to express a doctrine for governing state power over wildlife.2s Rather than give the state or the landowner unlimited authority over
the wildlife, the Supreme Court found wildlife to be the property of neither,
a status largely derivative of its fugitive and transitory nature.? The
Supreme Court altered this doctrine significantly when it redefined hunting
as a privilege and not a right, reflecting the change in necessity of hunting
and changes in social valuation of wildlife." These limitations on the state
regarding access to hunting and the classification of wildlife as an article of
commerce, however, did not offer the landowner any greater protection
from wildlife-caused damage.' The limitation on state power over
wildlife emerged within Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clause
analyses, and focused on the "dormant" commerce clause.
As the Supreme Court granted Congress broader license under
the Commerce Clause, states lost power over wildlife.' Consequently,

26. See id. at 23-26, describing the ideological debate between Blackstone and Christian,
two contemporary legal scholars. Blackstone condemned landowners' claims to rights to
wildlife as being a product of tyranny. His position relied on feudal rights to wildlife and
landowners' rights derived from royal grants. Christian argued for a landowner's rights
to wildlife derivative of property ownership and not of the crown. Blackstone's view won
out in early state court expressions on hunting rights of citizens, though it was likely the
political tenor of his themes which lead to the acceptance of his doctrines. Christian's
theories, however, were never meant for the United States, as the debate between them
concerned landowners in the United Kingdom, where title to land was established clearly.
27. Id. at 24-25.
28. In the first substantial challenge to the state power to regulate wildlife, to limit
hunting, and to impose commerce-discriminatory limitations on non-resident taking of
wildlife, the United States Supreme Court protected the state authority. Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896).
29. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,526.
30. The development of this doctrine began in McReady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877)
and culminated in more recent commerce clause cases. Compare 94 U.S. 391 (1877); Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 US. 322 (1979); Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371 (1978).
31. See LUND, supra note 18, at 39-40.
32. The 1930's New Deal court granted the federal government expansive powers under
the Commerce Clause. Prior to that court taking power, there were even doubts about
federal authority to regulate migratory birds. After that court took power, almost all wildlife
items could be analogized to home-grown wheat, thus falling within the aegis of "articles
of commerce." See generally,United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); Wickard
v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

1038,
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the state control over hunting relied on traditional state powers of
regulating for health, safety, or general welfare. States could act to
prevent undue risk to urbanized society from miscreant hunters or from
diseased animal populations, and to ensure steady herd sizes for aesthetic
and sport consumption. These interests reduced landowners' ability to
prevent injury to their land from wildlife. The Supreme Court's analyses
did not use the Takings Clause as an express limitation on state power
to regulate the nature of hunting, but relied on finding the injury to be
insignificant. Even where wildlife-caused damage was quantifiable,
Takings Clause analysis met with disfavor in other courts leaving an
injured landowner largely without remedy.
Even before modem herd management techniques emerged,
landowners faced difficulties in using lethal methods to prevent wildlifecaused damage to land.' Jurisdictions imposed limitations on hunting
to protect herds and thereby to achieve regular harvests. Once states
imposed restrictions on hunting methodology, limitations on hunting
seasons and take-limits came soon after. These limitations served a
variety of purposes-economic, ethical, and aesthetic-most of which remain
today.' The desirability of the purposes aside, these limitations on
hunting prevent landowners from protecting their land from unwanted
damage by wildlife. Thus, even where the purpose of hunting regulation
is consistent with social policy, a direct consequence of herd management
is increased damage to private land.
Where some states attacked the problem of residual and often
uncompensable damage through judicial means, New Mexico adopted
regulatory mechanisms.' The Department of Game and Fish adopted a
compensatory permit scheme that did not attempt to provide compensation equivalent to damage caused by wildlife.' This system
worked well because neither landowners nor the state needed to measure

33, Id. at 39 (describing some state-court claims for wildlife-caused damage to private

property interests). See also Parker Land &Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n,
845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993); Landsen v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409, affd 180 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1950),
cert. den., 335 US' 858 (1948); Thomson v. Dana, 52 F2d 759 (D. Or. 1931).

34. Id.at 35-38.
35. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179.
36. Gonzales only states that the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish adopted
a compensatory license scheme in the 1930s. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179. The DGF does
not keep these early regulations on file. Given that the present regulations do not provide

compensation equivalent to damage suffered, on a ranch-by-ranch basis, the author infers
that the previous regulations did not either. Compare Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179; 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 (1995).
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the injury suffered.- Early forms of the permit allocation system did not
rely on marketing the permits for compensating the landowner, but
merely allowed the landowner to take additional animals. This additional
allowance represented additional food for landowners and provided
benefits of two types-additional food for the landowner and marginal
reductions of depredations caused by wildlife. The State Game Commission amended the procedure several times, culminating in the most recent
form, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.
B. 19 N.MA.C. 30.5: Development of the CurrentSystem
Under the current regulatory system, the DGF provides limited
numbers of public licenses to kill elk on public land.' Landowners who
otherwise qualify for depredation allocation or for compensatory permits
may apply for and get these licenses without proving depredation of
private lands. Those landowners experiencing depredations may apply
for and receive additional special landowner permits for use on private
deeded land. Applying for the permit is free, but use of the permit to
claim a license requires payment of the statutory license fees." The DGF
allocates permits by use of mathematical formulae and by use of
administrative discretion.4 Once acquired, pursuant to signing the
DGF's Landowner Agreement, the permits may be transferred among
private parties without oversight by the DGF. 1 Licenses are more
difficult to transfer. Once claimed, the licenses are bound by the DGF's
seasonal constrictions' and by any landowner options that might render
the license ranch-only. 0 The landowner may appeal some administrative
decisions," but not discretionary permit allocations or findings of no
depredations. It is the use of the formula to decide base permit amounts,

37. See Gonzales, supra note 3; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-14.1 (Michie 1978). The regula-,
tion goes to great lengths to define formulae governing the allocation of permits. See 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.3-8.5 (1995). However, the regulation undermines these principles by
allowing substantial amounts of unreviewable discretion to vest in local officers. See 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.7-8.8 (1995).
38. See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 (1995).
39. 1995-1996 Agreement Concerning Harvesting of Elk on Landowner Property (N.M.
Dep't of Game and Fish, State Game Comm'n, 1995) ("Landowner Agreement").
40. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7-8 (1995).
41. Gonzales, supra note 3; at 180-81.
42. 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 (1995).
43. For example, if the landowner claims licenses for properties greater than 10,000
acres or if the landowner refuses to sign a land access waiver. In these cases, the permits
allow acquisition of licenses, but the licenses allow hunting only on the landowner's
property, and not within the greater boundaries of the Game Management Unit. See
Landowner Agreement, supra note 39; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 (1995).
44. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9 (1995).
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granting of discretionary permits to expand the allocation, and the very
limited right to appeal those results that are the most problematic for
landowners and environmentalists together.
The initial attempts at providing landowner compensation for elk
depredations corresponded with the DGF's creation of a rudimentary
license for private landowners.' The DGF developed that license in 1989
by promulgating Regulation No. 667.* The SGC amended it in 1992 to
extend the limited appeals process up through the DGF to the SGC.47 In
1995, the SGC made that regulation permanent and in a revised form in
19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.4 This revision codified the fuller appeals process
described in Amendment 1 of Regulation 667, State Game Commission
Order 3-92 and other structural and terminological changes. This
codification included changes in the definitions used in estimating elk
populations" and policies and procedures for issuing ranch-only
permits.50
During this period, the SGC and DGF greatly expanded the
variety of types of permits granted by allowing ranch-only permits for
hunting and management. Permits can be made ranch-only by request or
by default1 if the landowner opts not to sign the Landowner Agreement.'e The permits are specifically made ranch-only when the ranch
size is greater than 10,000 acres, with or without landowner signature of
the Agreement.' This arrangement allows for ranch-by-ranch management within Game Management Units (GMUs), s4 and seems designed
to encourage big game hunting ranches.' When a landowner signs the
access waiver in the landowner agreement, general permits are allocated

45. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179.

46. Regulation No. 667.
47. Amendment I of Regulation 667, supra note 4.
48. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 (1995).
49. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7.20 (1995).
50. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.6-8.9 (1995). For the purposes of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, ranch-only
permits allow a claimed license to be used on the ranch it was allocated to and no further.
Other permits allow greater degrees of access to the license holder, because licenses can be
used on ranches up to and including all participating private property throughout the Game

Management Unit. See generally Landowner Agreement, supra note 39.
51. Landowner Agreement, supra note 39, at 1.
52. The Landowner Agreement establishes some conditions and explanations for users
of permits. The Landowner Agreement is only sent to landownerswith depredations who
applied for permits and had adequate acreage and depredations to qualify for a permit
under the formulae contained in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.
53. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.6-8.9 (1995).
54. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.6 (1995).
55. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.7 (1995). Note that this same provision limiting the largest
ranches to ranch-only status applies the same constriction to entire GMUs. See infra Table
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which authorizes invasive hunting from any hunter bearing a permit for
the general GMU.m Landowners derive compensation for depredation
by elk from the sale of permits to acquire licenses to kill animals and not
from marketing access to private lands to hunters.'
Ranch-only permits serve a different purpose for the landowner
than the more general permits because the landowner's use of ranch-only
permits limits access by any hunter to the private land.' With ranch-only
permits, landowners can limit the damage caused by hunters by selecting
the hunters allowed onto their private property more carefully." When
the landowner does not use ranch-only permits, the landowner waives any
substantial right to exclude licensed hunters. Independent of damage to
private land by hunters, ranchers face elk-caused natural costs like forage
consumption and damage to fencing.' Allowing access to private lands
could cause higher costs for the landowners while reducing the natural
damages caused by the elk.' These permits serve the additional purpose
embodied in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2, incorporating Section 7.2, which
defines herd objective.'2 The Area Chief of a given GMU can issue ranchonly permits supplementary to the formula-based allotment the landowner
received.' Though the discretion allowed is limited,' the Area Chief

56. See Landowner Agreement, supra note 39.
57. See supra note 12; See also Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180 ("Public access is granted
to license holders without charge through a contract signed between the Department and
landowner in exchange for an authorization.")
58. See supra note 9.
59. The DGF grants these permits for the express purpose of limiting resident populations within the largest ranches to a specific levels. During the 1995 allocation, there were
only 49 ranches which qualified for the mandatory ranch-only status by size and 103 which
qualified by location. See 1995 Elk Landowner List (N.M. Dep't of Game and Fish, 1995); See
also Table 1; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.7 (1995). The focus of most of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 is on the
management of elk within GMU boundaries. The allocation of ranch-only permits for use
within "external ranch boundaries" does little more than increase the intensity of elk
management by defining GMU sub-boundaries. For the small landowners who receive only
a few permits to sell, the cost of having numerous hunters from all across the Game
Management Unit invade their ranch could be substantial.
60. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 181.
61. At some level, it is a simple tradeoff. As the number of successful hunters with
valid permits on a unit of private property rises, the local elk population falls. However,
hunters might accidentally panic elk, damage fences or forage while chasing and retrieving
the elk or its carcass. Further, because elk will share forage with other species, there is a risk
of damage to any cattle the landowner might own. These additional costs are not costs that
the landowner would bear in the absence of hunting and are therefore attributable to the
hunting. See generally, Raymond J.Boyd, American Elk, in BIG GAM! OF NORTH AMERICA 11
(John L. Schmidt & Douglas L. Gilbert eds. 1978).
62. That provision states that "'herd objective' shall mean the desire to increase,
decrease or maintain an existing estimated elk population at levels relative to previous-year
estimates." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 72 (1995).
63. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.1-8.2 (1995).
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could award, by accident or design, permits adequate to completely eradicate resident elk under the regulatory allowances made by "herd objective"
or "estimated population trends."'
Though the permit awarding system includes much discretion, the
increased appeals process contained in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 does not. The
appeals process does significantly expand the public accountability of the
DGF.' A landowner can challenge any formula-based allotment of
permits.' The appeals process proceeds upward through the levels of
administrative authority,' ultimately reaching the SGC,' where the challenger can present witnesses. 70 Prior to that SGC hearing, all other appeals
are conducted without witnesses and require investigation by the administrative officer.71 The final stage clearly raises the level of administrative accountability because it happens during regular and public SGC meetings.' Though the public cannot testify without some clear connection to
the parties at the hearing,'m the process does guarantee review by the
agency of its internal procedures if the landowner pursues a complaint.
Further, the process ultimately presents the private criticism in a public
forum.

64. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2 (1995).
65. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 uses several related terms to govern population trends from
season to season. Some of these imply a long term goal should exist, but the regulation does
not specifically require methods for developing a goal or evaluating previous goals. As
noted above, supra note 61, the regulation defines herd objective as "the desire to increase,
decrease or maintain an existing estimated elk population at levels relative to previous-year
estimates." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7.2 (1995). The regulation defines population trend as "the
elk population trends (increase, stable, decrease) relative to previously estimated elk
populations." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7.6 (1995). It does not demand that ranch-only discretionary allocations be consistent with general state policies or that the Area Chief confirm a
trend over time. With or without a conscious design, elk on a particular plot of land could
be completely eradicated. Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.8.1 (1995) with 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 §
8.1.4 (1995) (limiting depredation hunt permits to an additional 5% of total GMU allocation
per year).
66. See generally 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 (1995).
67. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.1-9.2 (1995).
68. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9 (1995).
69. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.5 (1995).
70. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.6 (1995).
71. See generally, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9 (1995).
72. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9..6 (1995).
73. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.6 provides that "If the State Game commission agrees to hear
the appeal, a hearing shall be scheduled during a regular meeting. At that time a reasonable
number of witnesses may be presented along with supporting documentation." The
emphasis of the appeals process is on personal involvement. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.2 (1995)
states that "If the landowner disagrees with the calculation, he may appeal the officers'
findings by first filing a written appeal, with supporting documentation, to the appropriate
Area Office Supervisor." The regulation does not prevent interested third parties from
speaking, but such parties must be presented by either the DGF or the landowner.
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The procedures described above are part of the authority to
create, grant, and -controlthe use of landowner permits vested in the New
Mexico Department of Game and Fish and derived from a series statutory
provisions guiding the DGF. Wildlife within the state are managed by the
state for the public under a public trust doctrine.74 Pursuant to that
authority, the legislature delegated the management responsibility to an
administrative agency through a series of statutes. The most general
statutory authority, N.M.STAT.ANN. § 17-1-1, provides policy guidance for
the DGF by describing the legislative intent in granting power to the
DGF . 5 N.M.STAT.ANN. § 17-1-14 (A)(13) allows the SGC to promulgate
licensing procedures for hunting of any protected species. Further,
N.M.STAT.ANN. § 17-1-14.1 allows the SGC to issue landowner permits
and the appropriate regulations. N.M.STAT.ANN. § 17-3-31 provides
similar authority for the DGF to issue permits for damage to crops.76
These two statutory authorizations can best be seen as providing
the state the tools to compensate landowners for displacement and
destructive losses caused by elk. Even though the statutes offer the DGF
the power to remedy the harms created by wildlife, the DGF chose not
to. The regulatory scheme currently in place fails its objectives and in
some cases, undermines them directly. Because of its continued failures,
the regulation must be changed, and the landowners more commensurately compensated. As Gonzales noted, "Some landowners believe that
wildlife has not paid its own way. They have not been able to derive
incomes comparable to those derived from livestock, crops, timber, and
other products."77 It is unsurprising that they turn to both harassment
and poaching of game. Because of these results, the regulation must be
changed.

74. State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 67 P.2d 240, 248 (N.M. 1936).
75. That provision states:
[ilt is the purpose of this act and the policy of the state of New Mexico to
provide an adequate and flexible system for the protection of the game and
fish of New Mexico and for their use and development for public
recreation and food supply, and to provide for their propagation, planting,
protection, regulation, and conservation to the extent necessary to provide
and maintain an adequate supply of game and fish within the state of New
Mexico.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1 (Michie 1978).
76. That statutory provision states: "the state game and fish warden [director of the
department of game and fish] may grant permits to owners or lessees of land and for the
capture or destruction on their lands of any protected game doing damage to their cultivated crops or property." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-31 (Michie 1978).
77. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180.
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Il. DISCUSSION
This section discusses the problems with the current version of
19 N.M.A.C. 30.5. Subsection A outlines the structural flaws in the
regulation as well as the flaws created by the application of the regulation. It focuses on the tendency toward inaccuracy created by a lack of
administrative duty to confirm depredations, problems created by the use
of delayed responses to the measurement of depredations, errors in the
regulatory treatment of marginal ranches with elk depredations, logical
flaws in assuming that all ranches can economically advertise private
landowner permits, and finally, the difficulties created by the appeals
process. Subsection B outlines the regulation's failings when compared
to other common law and statutory law provisions. It focuses on a need
for conjunctive analysis, considers the regulatory interference with the
defense of private property, and inspects the regulation's weakening of
private land trespass protection. Subsection C outlines the proposals for
reform of the current regulatory system. It discusses protecting the
landowner from sudden shifts of elk between tracts of private land and
modifying the appeals process to better serve the landowner.
A. Regulatory Problems: Lag, Fractionalism, and Disproportionality
Independent of difficulties with the as-applied results of 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5, the regulation creates problems because it creates
incentives that undermine its ostensible goals. It enforces a tendency
toward inaccuracy because neither private landowners nor the DGF have
a duty to inspect and report elk depredation levels. Further, the
regulation provides disincentives to accurate reporting, leaving the DGF
unable to safeguard the location and population of the elk. Also, the
regulation's formulae produce a fractional elk problem which unfairly
burdens small landowners.' The only method of offsetting depredation
losses, by selling the permits, fails to measure the cost to the landowner
and to compensate for the loss commensurately. Finally, the appeals
process, which does not allow challenge of departmental discretion,
leaves the landowner without a method to guarantee a remedy for the
problem: the elk on the land.

78. The fractional elk problem is a consequence of uneven division of the landowner
elk permits within a GMU across the qualifying ranches of the GMU. Assuming constant
returns from each permit sold, each ranch which merits permits will not get precisely the

correct quantity of permits adequate to compensate the landowner for the depredations suffered because the total permits available are limited by biological demands not compensatory demands. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2 (1995).
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1.Momentum Toward Inaccuracy
The regulation places no affirmative duties on the landowner or
the DGF to report or verify elk populations.' Assuming most landowners derive some benefit from marginal presence of elk, landowners will
report depredations when the cost of depredations and fence damage
outweighs the benefit from their "wildlife values."' The applicants for
elk permits represent those landowners who want permits to hunt, to
market, or to reduce the local elk population.' The further the level of
depredations outweighs the landowner's "wildlife value," the greater the
incentive to report. This incentive is heightened if the landowner observes
sudden upward shifts in the resident elk population.
These shifts occur because elk are hunted throughout the full
GMUs.8 Because most permits are not issued for ranch-only uses
individual parcels within GMUs can eradicate local elk populations while
other properties see little or no reduction. Because population management
is a factor of the state-wide8 and local elk population targets,s the

79. In a regulation governing short-term technical assistance provided to landowners
suffering from depredations and animal damage, the DGF must verify each landowner
claim. It specifically provides that the aid will be provided only "[alfter verification of the
complaint." Depredation Assistance to Landowners, Regulation No. 673 (N.M. Dep't of
Game and Fish, State Game Commission, Aug. 18, 1989). In 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, the DGF is
only required to "evaluate requests for private land authorizations in accordance with the
above procedures." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 6 9.1 (1995). Ironically, the more stringent verification
standard is applied in the regulation which each landowner can use only once. See
Regulation No. 673 § 1.2.1.a.
80. These values vary widely from person to person. Economists in the field have long
attempted to use personal wildlife values to structure wildlife management systems. One
simple version of this is 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5's predecessors. For a sound analysis of the field
reduced to non-economist language, see Donald J. Cocheba, Opportunities for Improving
Wildlife Management: An Economist's View, in VALUING WILDuLF 269 (Daniel J. Decker &
Gary R.Goff eds., 1987).
81. I assume only that landowners have some private value for the wildlife resident on
their land. Elk may be desired for a number of reasons, many of which are unlikely to bring
the landowner financial compensation. See Perry J. Brown & Michael J. Manfredo, Social
Values Defined, in VALUING WILDLIFE 12, 14-16 (Daniel J.Decker & Gary R. Goff eds., 1987).
The economic losses from elk and the unpriced wildlife values counterbalance each other.
The problem that this presents is two-fold: first that landowners may not have incentive to
report depredations by elk immediately which disguises the total economic loss caused by
elk; second that the state purpose for compensatory licenses may be ill-served by a
regulation which does not account for this limitation on landowner incentives.
82. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.1 (1995).
83. Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.6-8.8 (1995); 1995 Elk Landowner List, supra note 59.
84. As a function of combined GMU goals; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1.
85. The notion of local elk population targets is not explicit in the regulation. 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.4 appears to require unit-by-unit population goals. These goals, however,
are a product of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2 which provides that the relevant criteria are "herd
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regulation does not account for individual shifts among ranches. The overall elk population in the GMU might meet desired targets," but individual
ranches would be much less depredated. When the GMU's target population is allocated, the allocation will be determined inaccurately for
individual ranches, and the allocation of permits will remain inaccurate
unless annual individual ranch inspections are made by the DGF.
Landowners have an incentive to report depredations accurately
only when their level of depredation rises relative to previous measurements and the landowner could acquire additional permits. Every
inspection of displacement depredations will be inaccurate to a degree.
After an initial inspection, the only reason a landowner would re-inspect
for depredations is the opportunity to obtain more permits.87 When
more landowners participate within a GMU, the value of individual
landowner depredations falls." Thus, there is incentive to resist increased participation and to inflate the individual level of depredations.
This inflationary pressure is especially strong in smaller ranches which
most risk being marginalized. Consequently, the depredation permit
requests are not accurate representations of the elk population at large,
or of the burden experienced by landowners.
In addition to ineffectively controlling the landowner incentive
to report depredations, the regulation puts no affirmative duty on the
DGF to inspect depredations claims.8" During an appeal, it does require
that the claim be verified and investigated,' but the subject of appeal
is limited to the formula allotment, which limits the reach of the
verification requirement.9 The verification might reasonably include
inspecting for depredations,' but such action is not specifically required.
This narrow construction of the duty to inspect might be explained by the

objectives, estimated elk populations, estimated occupied elk habitat, relative elk densities,
past harvest data, and estimated population trend."
86. See, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2 (1995). This procedure does not consider burdens on
individual ranches except within the context of total burdens within the GMU. See 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.4-8.5 (1995) (governing only the fraction of total permits granted to a
ranch).
87. More accurately, a landowner would apply for permits only when the newlyacquired permits could be used to produce increased wealth for the landowner, that is, to
reduce the population to the point of marginal cost/benefit equilibrium. Permits that go
unmarketed produce little income; permits marketed for a much-reduced price might reduce
net income.
88. This is a function of the load of elk on private land required to produce a percentage
adequate to merit an elk permit. As the total acreage burdened by elk rises, if the landowner's
burden does not rise with it, over time, the landowner will receive fewer permits.
89. See supra note 2.
90. Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.3 (1995) with 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.2.1 (1995).
91. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.2.1 (1995).
92. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.2.1 (1995).
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statutory limitations of the DGF's ability to set prices for hunting license.
By statute, the DGF must limit its administrative fees to administrative
costs, and cannot change the prices of licenses." Individual verification
of depredations would entail inspections of over 2100 properties in 20
GMUs." It is unlikely that the limited administration fees can cover the
high costs of regular inspection, given a limited staff for the inspections
and the limitations on the departmental budget."
Failure to require inspections is not the only variable affecting the
annual determination of elk population and permit goals. The regulation
outlines the factors to be included in setting elk population targets.*
One factor included is "herd objective. "'9 Assuming there is a static
target population for the state and within GMUs, the herd objective
cannot be determined without information about the current population.
The regulation provides for "estimated populations"" and "estimated
population trends,"" but ignores the inevitable problem: the regulation
does not prescribe a procedure for estimation or verification in subsequent years."° It does not require the DGF to do additional calculations
apart from subtracting hunter successes from the original estimates."1
The regulation does not require full consideration of every relevant fact
when making its required comparison, but instead relies on card surveys
which are inherently inaccurate because there is no requirement that the
surveys be returned to the DGF. Where the DGF could require full

93. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-14(A)(13) (Michie 1978). The application process for a
permit to kill elk is free. To actually claim the license, however, effective April 4, 1997, the
fees are: resident elk cow $37, resident elk bull or either sex $60, nonresident elk cow $275,
nonresident bull or either sex $465, nonresident quality elk $750. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-13
(Michie 1978 and 1996 Supp.) governs the prices set for hunting licenses.
94. 1995 Elk Landowner List, supra note 59.
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-14(A) (Michie 1978).
96. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8. (1995) defines: "[t]he criteria ... shall be herd objectives,
estimated elk populations, estimated elk occupied habitat, relative elk densities, past harvest
data, and estimated population trend."
97. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7. (1995). The regulation defines herd objective as "the desire
to increase, decrease or maintain an existing estimated elk population at levels relative to
previous-year estimates."
98. See supra note 96.
99. Id.
100. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8 (1995).
101. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.3-8.4 (1995).
102. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7.18 (1995) provides that "Card Survey' shall mean the elk
hunter harvest survey provided by the Department for the purpose of determining elk
harvest. Only those returned to the Department for analysis will be used." The regulation
does not require that these surveys be returned to the DGF, and consequently, the
information gleaned from analyzing the card surveys will not measure the elk populations
as well as they might.
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reporting by all hunters, it does not.1ss Where the DGF could collect and
consider data about locations of hunter successes within GMUs, it does not.
Collecting complete data could provide valuable assistance in setting GMUpopulation goals as well as locations where discretionary permits would be
desirable, but the current regulation defeats this purpose.
This method of deducing current populations from hunter
successes magnifies any initial errors in the population census. Whether
the original error is underestimation or overestimation of elk population,
the consequence is marginalization of small landowners. In the first case,
marginalization occurs because a restricted number of licenses" results
in a higher elk burden being required per acre to qualify for a permit. In
the second case the smallest ranches are denied compensation because the
return per permit is lowered, making it economically inefficient for them
to participate in the program. Current targets for permits are directly tied
to hunting success."° When there are too few elk for the permits, hunters will be unsuccessful, resulting in more permits in the future."°
When there are too many elk, the hunting success in a given year will
decrease the permits available in the future. In either case, small
landowners cannot meet the demands of the system and the system stops
providing small landowners compensation for the burden on their land.
2. Sudden Population Shifts and Annual Responses
The regulatory structure also fails because it does not directly bar
man-made involuntary shifts of elk between private properties. In New
Mexico, there are no substantive limitations on the ability. of landowners
to harass game. While it is illegal to take the game out of season,"°
regulations do not bar harassment by use of animals, vehicles, or other
non-damaging techniques." When landowners waive their right to

103. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7.17 (1995).
104. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.42 (1995).
105. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.4.2 (1995).
106. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.4.2 (1995).
107. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-14(D) (Michie 1978).
108. Note that there are limitations on hunter methodology. Pursuant to N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1-14(D) (Michie 1978), the state game commission controls "[tihe hunting,
pursuing, capturing, killing or wounding of any game animals, birds or fish in or upon any
game refuge, rest ground or closed water or closed area or during any dosed season
established or proclaimed by the state game commission[.J" See also N.M..STAT. ANN. § 17-21 (Michie 1978). The DGF implements this authority in 19 N.M.A.C. 31.1, Hunting and
Fishing-Manner of Taking (N.M. Dep't of Game and Fish, State Game Comm'n, Apr. 1,
1995). This regulation is specifically limited to methods of hunting. The only significant
exception to that conclusion is N.M.A.C. 31.1 § 173 which provides that "lilt shall be
unlawful, at any time, to pursue, harass, harry, drive, or rally any protected species by use
of or from a motor-driven vehicle, powerboat, sailboat, or aircraft." This prohibition, though
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exclude trespassers in exchange for the permits, 9 the landowner
agreement makes no mention of barring harassment of game." Even
if the regulation or statutes prohibited harassment more broadly, there
are problems of proof. The most difficult distinction is between incidental
and deliberate harassment of game. Sudden shifts of population will not
be prevented by barring harassment of game, but by requiring consistent
monitoring of elk populations. When such a change is seen by the DGF,
the permits allocated within the GMUs should be reevaluated to ensure
accurate compensation.
Where there are sudden undesirable and reported invasions by
elk, local officers can act to prevent undue burdens on the landowner.
The permit process grants District Chiefs the power to award discretionary permits"' or to hold special depredation hunts."2 These responses
to elk population changes are counterproductive, however. The first
method is ineffective because these discretionary permits do not rely on
dear management principles"' for implementation. There is no clear
regulatory definition of when permits can be issued, and no evidence that
they will be issued in accordance with broader plans for elk population
or for landowner elk burdens." 4 The population goals for elk herds
represent a public policy decision. Allowing discretionary permits
without substantial guidance and supervision by either the public or
officials accountable to the public directly undermines the policy which
determined the population goals: it is no longer policy for New Mexicans
generally, but a policy for the District Chiefs. The unlimited delegation
of discretion leads to derogation of the statewide policy and a clear
preference for local interests. The wildlife of the state is to be managed
for the state, and the broader the local discretion, the less meaningful
statewide management plans will be.

made greater by the phrase "at any time," remains weaker than it might be because
landowners remain free to harass game on foot, from horseback, or any permutation
involving dismounting, hiking, or cycling in.
109. Landowner Agreement, supra note 39, at 1.
110. See generally Landowner Agreement supra note 39. In particular, the Landowner
Agreement does not work to prevent the landowner from acquiring GMU-wide permits,
selling them, and then harassing all the resident elk into leaving the landowner's property.
In such a case, the landowner can reap the financial benefits of the arrangement and suffer
few of the serious consequences of depredations and hunting. The regulation exacerbates
this problem if the DGF does not make annual verification inspections.
111. 19 N.M.AC. 30.5 § 8.8 (1995).
112. 19 N.M.AC. 31.8 § 8.1-8.2 (1995).
113. The regulation specifically provides: "The Director may authorize population reduction hunts for ... elk.., when justified in writing by department personnel." 19 N.M.A.C.
31.8 § 8.1.1 (1995).
114. See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 8.1-8.2 (1995).
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Just as unbridled administrative discretion undermines the
regulatory purposes, so do special depredation hunts. These special hunts
are counterproductive to the goal of managing the elk herd population
for the residents of the state and in ensuring compensation to landowners. The burden on private landowners of allowing public hunters onto
privately-owned land is substantial. During the landowner-permit
process, the landowner retains some control over the process of getting
compensation. The only goal of out-of-season depredation hunts is
population reduction,'"' and the landowner does not acquire title to the
permits and cannot sell them for compensation."6 Thus, these permits7
offer the landowner only the benefit of reducing the elk population,"
but not compensation for resident elk and no second try at a compensatory hunt. Consequently, these hunts only provide localized benefits to
selected ranchers. There is no showing that non-participating ranches
have access to either depredation hunts or to discretionary permits."8
Therefore, the only method for reducing the elk burden forces landowners to suffer invasive hunting on their private land; those that do not
wish to suffer the invasion are left without a legal remedy.
3. Marginal Ranches and FractionalElk
Because trophy hunters most value bull elk permits, the key to
determining a ranch's compensation for elk depredations is the number
of bull permits." 9 The highest bidders pay for horns on the wall. The
most frequent complaint by landowners is their inability to use cow elk

115. 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8

§

8.1.4 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 8.2.1 (1995).

116. 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 8.2.5 (1995) provides: "An agreement will be signed by the
landowner disallowing the ability to charge a fee for those authorizations or associated
trespass rights."
117. 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 8.2.1 (1995).
118. The permits and proof must be applied for before consideration is made. The
discretionary permits are "allocated to affected ranches" in cases where necessary to achieve
the desired harvest "on a case-by-case basis." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.8 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C.
30.5 § 8.8.1 (1995).
119. See Decker, Daniel J, et al., Theoretical Developments in Assessing Social Values of
Wildlife: Toward a Comprehensive Understandingof Wildlife Recreation Involvement, in VALUING
WILDLIFE: EcoNoMIc AND SOcIAL PEusPcrIV 90-91 (Daniel J.Decker &Gary R. Goff eds.,
1987). The authors suggest that hunters progress through stages of participation that can be
characterized by satisfaction of their needs. Even when a hunter moves to the highest level
of participation, in which the hunter "finds satisfaction in the total hunting experience," the
key is that "[tWhere is a breadth of satisfactions available to him." Id. Consequently, even if
the hunter progresses past the trophy stage, the hunter will still derive satisfaction from the
trophy qualifies of the target.
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permits for profit.12D Ranches must advertise to sell the permits, 2' and
the cost of advertising, added to the cost of bearing the elk, must be less
than the price paid for the permit if it is to be profitable. When a ranch
receives only one permit, it does not benefit from economies of scale in

advertisement.' When the smallest ranch receives a single permit for
a cow license, its expected return is much less, which exacerbates the
problem. Thus, a larger ranch can use its bull elk permits and their
higher return to offset the lower return from cow permits, while a smaller
ranch cannot do so. The costs of carrying male and female elk on private
land are essentially the same; it is only the sale price of permits
which distinguishes the value of the permits. Consequently, the smaller
marginal ranch receives less compensation from the permit process, even

with the same per-acre burden of elk. This difference in levels of
compensation is aggravated when the landowner suffers substantial
invasion of his land by24hunters in the process of using the single permit

allotted to their ranch.
In addition to the problems discussed above, the permit process
creates fractional elk. These artificially-created elk are the fractional

uncompensated depredation left when the regulatory formula divides the
predetermined quantity of permits throughout the GMUs total occupied
acres. The fractions in allocating permits occur for two reasons. First,
because individual landowners do not have the undivided year-round

120. Telephone Interview with Al Schneberger, N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n, Albuquerque, N.M. (Nov. 7, 1995).
121. Advertisement here is used broadly to mean any communication initiated by
private parties. At a minimum, it requires conversation which has opportunity costs, and
at the most, it is purchased communication.
122. Economies of scale in advertisement would produce a lower cost of advertising per
permit sold. The notion is that a single advertisement might be adequate to sell one or a
hundred permits, but the act of advertisement is a fixed cost which can be amortized
amongst the total number of permits sold. The scope of this paper does not include substantial discussion of fragmentation of the permit market, diversification of the permit market,
or the inherent flaws in advertising a single price in classified advertisement. These
elements are decidedly secondary to the simpler notion that the cost of advertising can be
spread amongst all permits sold.
123. The cost of carrying a cow might be slightly higher if the cow is bearing a calf. Both
the calf after birth, and the cow's increased consumption prior to calving, might raise the
forage losses over those caused by bull elk. The distinction is likely to be slight, and
certainly not key to the analysis of the burdens on the landowners.
. 124. A landowner bears the full cost of hunter "misses" where hunters come onto the
land and fail to take a licensed animal. A landowner wishing to drop the resident elk
population as low as possible might sign the waiver and endure a great many "passthrough" hunters and their failures. See Landowner Agreement, supra note 39, at 1. At a
minimum, a hunting failure results in higher future costs created by a larger resident elk
population. The problem is exacerbated because there is no guarantee that this specific
landowner will be compensated by additional permits in the future.
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attention of resident elk."2 Elk migrate to summer and winter forages
throughout the year, and consequently, landowners cannot measure
depredations by simply counting elk." Second, the fractions appear
because ranch sizes are inconsistent with the occupied acreage requirement per landowner permit (a number which varies from GMU to
GMU and from year to year)."z These fractional elk appear in every
ranch calculation, but as the ranch size increases, the impact of the
fractional elk decreases proportionally."S When the formula is used to
calculate permits, remainders in the division of total occupied weighted
acres, and the total permits available, occur.'" 9 The regulation does not
give explicit preference to every applicant with bona fide verifiable
depredations; 3 ' thus the regulation does not assure that every such
applicant will get at least one permit. 3' Consequently, some landowners with depredations will be denied permits because of their ranch
size.132 Fractional elk represent much smaller burdens for larger ranches, because they will receive permits to sell and thereby offset the

125. RAYMOND J. BOYD, American Elk, in BIG GAME OF NORTW AMERICA 11, 18-19 (John
L Schmidt & Douglas L. Gilbert, eds., 1978). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-201
(West 1993), which contains the finding that
(a) irluminating animals such as cows, deer, antelope, and elk tend to eat
for short periods of time during the day and then move to resting places
at other times, making it appear as though they are not continuously
present; and
(b) Notwithstanding such appearances, it is appropriate to recognize that
when such animals graze on private or leased private land intermittently
during any given day, the amount they consume may be comparable to the
amount they would consume if they remained present and visible on such
land for the entire day.
126. See BOYD, supra note 125, at 18-19.
127. When considering the effect on a single GMU, the formula in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5
§ 83-8.5 (1995) can be reduced to an occupied acreage requirement per permit allocated.
This number will vary across GMUs for a variety of reasons. The number of participating
ranches, the acreage of participating ranches, the percentage of hunting successes within the
GMU, and the DGF's elk population estimates and targets will all influence this number.
Once the formula adjusts the acreage of each participating ranch for its level of occupation
and goals, this number can then be divided by the total landowner permits available. For
example, assuming that every ranch in a GMU is sized as-a multiple of 50 acres, using two
diametric sizes like 50 acres and 5000 acres, and assuming, that the GMU formula
determines that for each 30 acres a landowner permit will be awarded, the two ranches will
suffer significantly different burdens. The smallest ranch will be uncompensated for 40% of
the total burden suffered, while the larger ranch suffers only .04% incompensation.
128. See infra Table 1.
129. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.4.1 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.5 (1995).
130. Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.5 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.8 (1995).
131. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.8 (1995) provides: "additional landowner permits may be
allocated to affected ranches."
132. See infra Table 1.

Fall 19961

FRACTIONAL ELK

marginal uncompensated elk burden. When the smaller ranches receive
no permits, they have no legal remedy for their elk burden and fall
outside the ambit of the regulatory system.
4. Fixed Costs: Limited Benefits From Transfers
The sole method 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 provides for compensating
landowners for the burden of their depredations is the use or transfer of
permits." Once awarded, the permit becomes private property, fully
transferable between buyer and seller.'3 Individual permits might be
limited to ranch-only use, but the transfer of the permit is not barred. The
profitability of the transfer is dependent on the individual landowner
acting to advertise and negotiate the price for the permit, and thereby
whatever compensation for the elk depredations, and the DGF does not
intervene in that process.
The transfer process imposes costs on the parties, even if they
negotiate conditions which are most favorable to both. These costs
include applying for the permits," inspection by the landlord and
verification by the DGF,' marketing the permit, and, negotiating with
a pool of potential buyers for the best price. Moreover, there will be
technical costs because the return-maximizing landowner might need to
waive the right to exclude other permit-bearing hunters. 37 Though the
landowner is not required to sign the waiver clause in the application," a ranch-only permit would be less valuable to a hunter than a
game management unit-wide permit. A landowner intending to market
permits broadly and thereby to compete with other landowners across the
state, would prefer to make the waiver and sell the more valuable
permits, even with the higher internal costs.'"

133. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Landowner Agreement, supra note 39, at 2 instructs: "landowner... will provide
reasonable access to include keys and/or combinations if necessary, to locked gates for
Department personnel."
137. Id. at 1 (waiver clause).
138. Id.
139. There is also a prisoner's dilemma problem here. Each landowner can maximize the
return gained by each permit if each other landowner also makes the waiver. Assuming that
elk density across a GMU is consistent, this would not be problematic. If that density varies,
it behooves a landowner with high elk density to refuse the waiver and to hoard the
resident elk for the permits he can market. There is another reason to refuse the waiver in
variable-density GMUs: a landowner making the waiver and possessing high density populations is likely to have more hunters on the land. That 'invasion cost' caused by other
permits from which the landowner did not profit would be a disincentive to continue to
waive the exclusionary right.
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Landowners suffer other costs as part of the regulatory compensation process. Aside from privately-caused damage to fencing, which is
punishable by New Mexico law,"4 the private parties bear the full costs
of the hunting.' In a competitive market for permit sales, the most
cost-efficient sellers will be those who can minimize the transaction costs
for each permit sold. The marketing and verification/inspection costs are
fixed costs, and consequently are reduced per permit as the quantity of
permits sold rises. These fixed costs are what provide the marginal profit
between equal landowners. There will be other factors such as hunting
amenities or vehicle access which affect the price chargeable per
permit." Consequently, the larger ranches can better minimize the per
unit fixed costs, and will push smaller ranches, which cannot meet those
reduced costs, out of the permit-selling market.
Though its purposes are described as applying to all landowners,
the regulation does not assure all landowners that their individual costs
will be recovered by the sale of permits.'" Under the guise of granting
all landowners the freedom to negotiate permit prices, the real effect of
the regulation is to encourage the propagation of wildlife by a select few
ranches which are the most profitable. The most lucrative ranching
operations will not be those which merely market permits, but those
which receive numerous permits and carry more bull elk.'" Large ranch
owners can facilitate the growth of the resident elk herds.' By remov-

140. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-47-12 (Michie 1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-16-9 (Michie 1995);
Brown v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 152, 156 (N.M. 1961).
141. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 181.
142. If these beneficial conditions are incidental (such as easy vehicle access), then the
goods are essentially the same. If they are created in response to hunter demand (such as
lodging, guides, or blinds), the goods provided has changed substantially.
1 143. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180. Further, the regulation defines part of its scope as
"Illandowners who experience elk utilization within their deeded lands." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5
§ 2 (1995). Additionally, the criteria for establishing the desired elk populations do not
include ensuring even the most rudimentary management of the landowner permit market
(which might ensure that depredated landowners are guaranteed a recovery). See 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2 (1995). Once the regulation adopts this broad scope, surely its true
objectives should reach all of the intended audience.
144. See infra Table 2.
145. Dean Lueck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 625, at 643 (1995). Lueck states: "as the size of land holdings increases, the
resulting decrease in the costs of contracting among landowners will increase the gains from
transacting an agreement among the landowners and the more likely it is that the rights to
the wildlife stock will be established." For a large landholder in New Mexico, the prophecy
is self-fulfilling. Because the DGF already grants limited property rights to elk to
landowners, applying Lueck's model indicates that the decreasing contract costs will favor
the larger landowners. Applying this comment's model (suggesting that there are substantial
fixed costs), the implication is clear the largest landowners and only the largest landowners
have a direct and substantial interest in maintaining elk populations.
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ing cattle and growing the correct forage, the landowner can enhance the
resident elk population, qualify for more landowner permits, and
dominate the market. A large ranch owner might even have an incentive
to under-report his burden to keep the total permits sold down, raising
the value of permits within the GMU by limiting the supply of permits
available. The result is that the compensation for depredations on private
land accrues to a limited few that can offer a specialized service. Because
they cannot compete for higher levels of compensation, small landowners
have little incentive to participate aside from their own enjoyment. After
hunters fulfill their personal consumptive demand for elk, landowners
are more likely to chase off elk to other lands than take elk in accordance
with the regulatory goals.'"
5. Administrative Failures:Appeals and Individual Arrangements
The appeals process created by 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 provides little
certainty for the landowner and little accountability for the Department
of Game and Fish. The process contains several significant faults, all of
which must be changed. This subsection describes the appeals process
generally, critiques the faults it presents, and finally, discusses proposals
for change.
The regulation allows appeals of formula-based allotments. 147
Landowners are not required to accept the offered permits," but are
limited to them if they do accept the allotment. 49 The appeals process
is strictly limited to the formula-based permit allotments.' s° The landowner cannot challenge the award of discretionary permits.1 Further,
the landowner cannot challenge the gender-balance of the permit
allotment, because the gender allotment is not generated as a function of
the formula. " , The regulation does not provide guidance for the

146. The question is of marginal cost for the incremental take. The hunter-landowner
concludes that the cost outweighs the marginal benefit for the incremental take. Assuming
the landowner can obtain the permit, that the landowner uses some permits for personal
consumption, and that the landowner obtains a diminishing return of benefits from
increased taking of elk, the fixed permit-license fees will produce a situation where the cost
of taking the elk outweighs any possible benefit. The landowner will pursue the benefit of
elk elimination through less costly means: the landowner will chase the elk herd from the
private land.
147.. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.2 (1995).
148, Landowner. Agreement, supra note 39, at 1; Gonzales, supra note 3, at 181.
149. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.0 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.8.1 (1995).
150. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.2 (1995).
151. Id.
152. Id. at § 8.4-8.5.
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allotment of discretionary permits, aside from some general descriptions,"s and discretionary allotments are not reviewable by DGF
administration or the public.'" ' The gender burden of the allotment does
not appear subject to administrative review, and no provisions for gender
preferences for small ranches appear in the regulation. 5 An appeal of
the gender distribution allocated to landowners in their permits would
at least ensure a minimum return to small landowners. Ideally, preference
should be given to granting bull-elk permits to small landowners.
Though the regulation allows for appeals of formula allotments
by allottee landowners,"5 ' a number of other decisions should be
appealable by landowners generally. For example, when a landowner is
denied permits, and discretionary permits are awarded within the same
GMU to other landowners, challenge to the inspection of lands and the
relative elk burdens would be appropriate. Further, a landowner who
was denied permits should be allowed to question the inspections of
other local ranches and their allotments, since inaccuracy in the measurement of other ranches could bias the required burden upwards, leading
to unjustified denial" By limiting the appeals process to formula-based
allotments, the regulation encourages discretionary permits and prevents
substantial public review. Similarly, because the state manages the elk
herd for the benefit of the general public as well as the specific private
landowners, there should be some public accounting for discretionary
decisions made by the DGF.' s
The regulation serves to govern two elements within the process
of achieving state policy. The first element is that it works to achieve the
general state policy outlined in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-19 The second
element is that it supports the specific state policy outlined by the determinations of population targets made by 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5"' and 19

153. Id. at § 8.2.
154. Id. at § 9.
155. Id. at § 8.5.
156. Id. at § 9.1-9.2.
157. This is especially problematic where the GMU is a heterogenous blend of large
ranches and smaller ones. Where there is homogeneity, the risk of this other ranch bias falls.
See infra Table 1.
158. Specifically, the general public should have access to the documentation supporting
these decisions. It is unlikely that the disinterested general public would concern itself with
the nature of permits allocated on a discretionary basis. However, specific interested parties,
especially those within the Game Management Unit could have particularly strong interests
in access to this information.
159. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 3 (1995).
160. Id. at § 3, 8.1-8.5.
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N.M.A.C. 31.8.61 Its balancing of previous hunting successes and
ultimate targets work to produce a state policy goal of harvests and
revenue.162 The closer total landowner participation comes to full
participation, the more elk populations will reach the desired equilibrium.
The fewer the claims in a GMU, the more individually important a landowner will be." Specifically § 8.5.2 and .3 provide that a specific
ranch's allotment is related to its proportion of the overall total ranch
acres depredated by elk." The larger the ratio of total private land in
the GMU to private land occupied by elk (depreciated by density of
depredation), the larger the minimum required occupied acreage for a
permit to be allotted.1" Consequently, with minimal participation, a
small ranch will receive permits above the equilibrium, limiting its
burden to a position lower than state policy prescribes. As participation
rises, its burden will rise,'" and its ability to offset the burden by
compensation will fall. As noted above, small ranches suffer the greatest
impact by the presence of even a few elk, when compared to larger
ranches. The regulation thus puts increasing burdens on them to
advertise, and to do so successfully. This could eventually drive the
small-ranch participant from the market for bearing elk on private lands.
-While this regulation implies a burden on landowners in
planning desired elk populations for GMUs, 67 it discourages consideration of those burdens. The authority given to the DGF is plenary." Its
goals and methods of achieving those goals should be subject to public
review. Further, the regulation does not provide for public planning and

161. See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 13 (1995). Note that within this regulation, the discretion of
the local District Chief to countermand the general social policy is limited. See id. at § 13.1.
Furthermore, the Area Chief's discretion to permit private land population reduction hunts
("depredation hunts") on private land is based on administrative input from the District
Chief as well as input from the landowner. The actual numbers allocated through the
formulae in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.3-8.5 (1995) are determined through the State Game
Commission, and spelled out in 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 13.6-13.7 (1995).
162. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2 (1995).
163. Id. at § 8.5.
164. Id.
165. Id. at § 8.5.3.
166. Id. at § 8.5.
167. Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 2 (1995), which provides that it serves "all hunters who
wish to recreate on deeded lands [in New Mexico]," with 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 8.1.1 (1995)
which provides that agents of the DGF "may authorize population reduction hunts for..
. elk ... when justified in writing by department personnel." The first demonstrates an
understanding of regular and continuous elk incursion on private lands, while the second
responds to an incidental incursion by elk.
168. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1, 14 (Michie 1995).
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inputss as it determines those methods and goals. This planning and
input is not merely an abstract public desire for more wildlife expressed
in terms of additional elk, it is a gauge of the changes in the local
ownership and usage of land and a measure of the economic viability of
certain types of land uses. If there were adequate demand, it could be
cost-effective for ranches to specialize in outfitting and hunting rather
than cattle ranching. The current regulation does not consider these and
similar economic shifts and the role of the ranches in these changes when
it plans for elk populations.170
In addition to the economic shifts that marketing elk can produce
on ranches, other individual management decisions can have effects on
elk populations. Individual landowners fencing out elk can have
substantial effects on nearby residents, and even on the elk populations
at large. Elk are significantly mobile-capable of migrating 250 miles
between summer and winter seasons-and cross a number of terrains in
New Mexico.'" They maintain seasonal forage areas and shift between
them."7 Consequently, erecting elk-proof fencing could shift the
migratory patterns of a specific herd or could make migration impossible.
Without consideration of landowner interests and without accounting for
fencing plans of landowners, interruptions in seasonal elk shifts and in
population dynamics are possible. The incentive to use elk-proof fencing
exists, and must be considered when the SGC determine long term elk
population targets.
Furthermore, elk migratory patterns might be better managed in
a regionally coordinated manner. It might be desirable to market regions
as elk havens where hunters can hunt on private land without fear of
damaging cattle or trespassing. By coordinating landowner desires for elk
population levels, interest in elk-proof fencing, and the economic interest
in commercial hunting of the elk, the returns to the state and the
individual ranchers could be raised. Also, by coordinating those interests,
direct compensation to landowners by interested parties could be
facilitated. Currently, the state does not factor into its decisions privately
arranged dedications of land for wildlife uses. In these arrangements,
private citizens might pay landowners to free their land from cattle and

169. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.1 (1995) provides only that: "The Director, upon approval of
the State Game Commission, at the annual big game regulation Commission meeting, shall
establish the number of elk licenses within game management units through use of the elk
allocation system as described herein." It does not provide for explicit inclusion of public
preferences.
170. Id.at § 8.2.
171. Boyd, supra note 125, at 18.
172. Id. at 20-22.
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to allow it to return to a natural state."n These types of "dedicated land
for compensation" deals" would accurately measure the public interest
in wildlife and elk specifically. It would seem appropriate for any policy
regarding elk on private land to consider this form of compensation, and
to adjust for the effects on elk population and landowner permits.
In conclusion, five key failures of the regulation undermine its purposes. The regulation fails to manage the internal and external incentives
operating on landowners as a group and individually. The smallest landowners have no special protection from the burdens of elk, and the regulation marginalizes these ranches by inflicting the greatest burdens on them.
Ultimately, the regulation fails its purposes because it allows excessive
discretion and does not account for specialized land-use decisions.
B. Regulatory Inconsistencies:Common Law and Statutory Failings
While the regulation fails for all the reasons discussed above, the
regulation also suffers from conflicts with the common law and statutory
provisions of New Mexico law. First, regulation conflicts with statutory
provisions because the DGF does not allow for cost-benefit consideration
of the elk population, and fails to consider the long term shifts of the
population. Second, the regulation prevents the landowner from protecting

173. Ranches are considered only in terms of their total deeded acreage. 19 N.M.A.C.
30.5 § 8.5 (1995). While the elk-proof fencing would affect the degree of depredations, this
is only a factor if the DGF conducts regular inspections. Without a duty to report the
reduced depredations, a landowner can undermine the purpose of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.5
by taking more permits than would be merited had the elk-proof fenced land been
discounted from the total deeded acreage. The regulation does not explicitly consider the
changes in practical environment caused by individual management decisions of this sort.
Additionally, the regulation does not account for arrangements where compensation is
paid to landowners to remove cattle from private land. In such a case, the regulation would
assume 100% occupation and award landowner permits accordingly. This exchange causes
two possible results. First, the landowner can receive the economic windfall and sell the
permits in addition to the prior agreement's compensation. If the purpose is to compensate
landowners for elk displacement of cattle, the regulatory purposes are undermined. Second,
if the landowner does not apply for permits and does not reap whatever windfall exists, the
DGF will not accurately measure elk populations by its deductive methods. Consequently,
the DGF must at least make some accounting for the change in use caused by these
arrangements when it estimates population and allocates permits.
174. Typically, the landowner agrees to dedicate a quantity of land for a specific use for
monetary compensation. As Gonzales noted, other writers found that landowners felt that
"wildlife had not paid its own way" by matching the rates of return available from other
uses. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180. One way of allowing higher returns to wildlife uses is
protecting these forms of compensation. Even assuming the DGF accounts for dedicated
land in allocating permits to prevent a windfall to anyone, if the DGF accounts for the elk
by reducing the elk population elsewhere, the public interest in managing the elk population is misserved.
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the land directly. Thus, the landowner loses control over the regulatory
process on private land, which conflicts with the purposes of other statutory doctrines of land management. Finally, the regulation contradicts
common law trespass protection because the regulation presumes the presence of elk on private land.
1. A Cost-Benefit Analysis is Needed
In a recent article, Dean Lueck posits a model in which land-owner
rights to wildlife should be extended under certain circumstances."7
Though wildlife-related land uses can most easily described as various
combinations of wildlife and a single other use, the model conceives of
multiple forms of use of the same plot of land. Lueck's demonstrates that
at times, because of contract costs, returns from wildlife uses will outweigh
returns from more traditional uses, and that this leads to acquisition of
private rights in wildlife." The model assumes that the landowner
retains control over the choice between competing uses for privately owned
land.'" If the landowner must entirely dedicate specific plots of land for
producing a good, and if this total dedication is within rights associated
with private land, any time wildlife damage the private land, the wildlife
diminishes the private landowner's rights. In applying Lueck's model to
19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, the question is whether the wildlife on private land is
merely accidental overflow of wildlife from state land, or whether it is
somehow distinct from public land wildlife, and therefore, whether the
landowner should have some right to the wildlife on private land.'"
Under New Mexico statutory provisions, there is no distinction
between overflow and privately-resident wildlife. 1" Elk are one of the

175. Lueck, supra note 145, at 625.
176. Id. at 643-45.
177. Id. at 638-42.
178. This comparative productivity analysis can form the foundation for determining
when and what type of property rights emerge from any given allocation of interests. Elinor
Ostrom and Edella Schlager, The Formation of Property Rights, in RIGHTS TO NATURE 127
(Susan S. Hanna, et al., eds., 1996). In the case of elk permits, the state has adopted one
method for allocating rights without making an evaluation of the interests underlying those
rights. A right without sufficient interest-one that is too expensive to exercise-will likely
never be exercised, and consequently, determination of the interest is a necessary predicate
to allocating the rights. Similarly, the collective and individual administrative costs for the
exploitation of the property rights will militate for or against the adoption of the rights by
the individual-even when the rights are available from the sovereign. Thrainn Eggertsson,
The Economics of Control and the Cost of Property Rights, in RGHTs TO NATURE 157 (Susan S.
Hanna, et al., eds., 1996).
179. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1, 17-1-14 (Michie 1995). Compare Gonzales,
supra note 3, at 180 ('7he critical factor is that appropriate habitats exist for wildlife to
overflow onto. Case in point- New Mexico's elk and pronghorn antelope populations were
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many wildlife products managed by the DGF.Is Assuming the legitimacy
of its elk provisions, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 and 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 must also meet
the conditions established by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1. That statute defines
the policy of New Mexico underlying the State Game Commission wildlife
regulations. Thus, the population goals and corresponding permit
allocations must meet a requirement of population adequacy.' s State
regulation of and private production of wildlife jointly produce wildlife
where private lands voluntarily serve to expand production of statesponsored goods, by contributing some fraction of their rights in land to the
production of those state-sponsored goods."s Assuming that New Mexico
can co-opt private land in this manner without significant input from
landowners, the question is not whether more elk can be supported, but
whether it is economically efficient to do so.s Because a number of wild
ruminants compete for generally the same forage,' production of one
species would require consideration of the burdens of the other species on
the same lands.
Neither is this economic balancing a problem for only one type of
landowner, or only a problem of balancing the interests of the DGF and a
single landowner. Even though elk eat grass-type forage for the majority of
the year,Iss if the herd loses substantial portions of their customary land
because of elk-proof fencing, the herd can subsist on forested land.ss
Thus, for at least a few seasons, direct and damaging consequences can

restored almost entirely on public and state lands. The results were that wildlife overflowed
onto available habitat regardless of ownership.").
180. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180.
181. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1 (Michie 1995).
182. See supra note 80; Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180-81. By deeming private property
as probable habitat for elk, the DGF uses that private property for the public purpose of
raising elk. See Lueck, supranote 175, at 655-61. The voluntarism of the relationship between
the private landowner and the DGF is questionable. Even though there are certain
regulatory elements which are entirely voluntary, landowners cannot opt to have no resident elk. See generally, Landowner Agreement, supra note 39; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 (1995).
183. CompareN.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-1; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 (1995). Note that neither statute
nor regulation defines an upper bound to the size of population. It seems likely that the
only real upper bound would be the public willingness to allow the unrestricted expansion
of elk on private land and the degree of administrative accountability to legislators and their
constituents. The rejection of a taking claim against the state found several justifications for
support. See Montana ex rel. Sackman v. State Fish & Game Comm'n, 438 P.2d 663 (Mont.
1968) (finding state immunity from the claim because, at the time of purchase, the
landowner knew of resident elk on the property); State v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86 (Mont.
1940) (finding that acquisition of land in Montana is made presumptively with notice and
knowledge of the presence of wild animals); State v. Urban, 245 N.W. 474 (S.D. 1932)
(finding the lost crops consumed by wild pheasants to be valueless).
184. BOYD, supra note 125, at 20-21.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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occur to a wide variety of rural landowners. The policy choices underlying
the propagation of elk must be considered within the benefits that can be
derived from propagating other species, including cattle. Unilateral planning for one'species without explicit consideration of the attendant burdens
produces inefficient results.
One of these results is that the only limiting factors bn an individual species is the other species. On private lands, where cattle compete with
elk, and a landowner is unable to substantially limit the elk without harassing them, the cattle population adjusts to suit the available food
supplies. Given feed requirements for cattle and given limited forage
product from the range, the elk drive cattle from the land. When cattle are
displaced by elk or deer, the landowner receives limited compensation for
the lost income. The effects on the cattle, whether from reduced carrying
capacity leading to reductions in cattle herd size or from reduced feed for
the cattle requiring increased dietary supplementation, directly affect the
landowner. In certain cases, the displacement may bring a net improvement
to the productivity of the land. In most cases, however, the landowner
permit process is inadequate to compensate for losses incurred by every
landowner. Without balancing the economic benefits with the costs shifted
to landowners when propagating elk, the current policy does more harm
than good.
2. PrivatePropertyNeeds Additional ProtectionFrom Regulatory Interference
Ranching is a risky business. Storms, drought, disease, predators,
and elk can substantially affect a rancher's operation. The risk has always
rested with the rancher: he has always borne the consequences for acts of
nature. Though insurance may cover some forms of injury, New Mexico
law supports the affirmative protection of property from other forms of
injury.187 For example, New Mexico issues crop-and-property licenses for
destruction of animals as innocent as jackrabbits.'" These licenses serve
the purpose of protecting private property.'" The landowner must file a

187. See Stewart v. Oberholtzer, 258 P.2d 369 at 370 (N.M. 1953) ("where the running of
livestock is lawful, it is the duty of the owner of property to effectively enclose it should he
desire to keep roaning stock off his premises."). See generally Woofter v. Lincoln, 309 P.2d
622 (N.M. 1957); Gallegos v. Allemand, 157 P.2d 493 (N.M. 1945). See also N.M. STAT. ANN.
30-8-13(B) ("Every owner or custodian of livestock shall exercise diligence to keep his
livestock off the state public fenced highways."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-17-3 (Michie 1953).
188. See N.M. Att. Gen. Op. 1379, at 120 (1936).
189. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-31(Michie 1995).
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complaint and the carcass remains state property.190 Allocation and use

of elk permits is implicitly conditioned on compliance with the public trust
doctrine which defines the state administration of wildlife."' This trust

relationship implies non-malignancy of use.' s
The current regulation does not contain a non-malignancy test." 3
There is no explicit statement of non-detrimental use, but other state
statutes and regulations which allow landowners to defend their property
(within certain guidelines) independent of state wildlife management goals
and plans imply it strongly.'" Thus, there is an inherent inconsistency

when the state possesses property defense statutes and then deliberately
plans for the wildlife to damage private property. The special forcedparticipation system created by 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 interferes with the
liability assumed by landowners for incidental contact with wildlife. 95

Instead of assuming that elk depredations will be an incidental effect of
close contact with elk habitat," the elk will be resident on private lands

190. See State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 67 P.2d 240,244 (N.M. 1936) (requiring lawful
licensure for private possession). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-21 (Michie 1995) (requiring
state officials to attempt to sell the carcass of animals taken illegally). See generally N.M. Op.
Atty. Gen. No. 88-43 (1988).
191. State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 67 P.2d 240, 254 (N.M. 1936); N.M. Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 88-43 at 1 (1988).
192. Non-malignancy here is used broadly to mean that the managed wildlife should not
be used to the detriment of citizens.
193. Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 (1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 (1995).
194. The DGF controls depredation damage to private land. It provides short term
protection to landowners suffering injury caused by protected species without reference to
type of animal causing the injury or type of injury caused. Depredation Assistance to
Landowners, Regulation No. 673 (N.M. Dep't of Game and Fish, State Game Comm'n, 1989).
The New Mexico Legislature provided that compensatory landowner permits be issued for
elk and antelope damaging private land. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-14, 14.1 (Michie 1978 and
1995 Repl. Pamp.). Further, the basis for those statutes is in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-31
(Michie 1978 and 1995 Repl. Pamp.), which provides that the DGF 'may grant permits to
owners or lessees of land and for the capture or destruction on their lands of any protected
game doing damage to their cultivated crops or property." Where a species is unprotected,
the landowner's rights are significantly greater. In N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-1-2 (Michie 1978
and 1993 Repl. Pamp.), the Legislature provided "that it shall be the right of any owner of
livestock so killed or injured by the actions of any dog to kill the dog while it is upon
property controlled by the owner of the livestock."
195. This interference has two parts. First, the landowner cannot provide self-help defense of the private land suffering trespasses by wildlife. Second, the regulation does not
fully protect the landowner from all the consequences of invasion. See 19 N.M.A.C. 31 § 8.2
(1995); 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.5 (1995); Gonzales, supra note 3, at 179-80.
196. The physical proximity of private land to otherwise undisturbed elk habitat is likely
to produce coincidental contact with elk. The distinguishing factor between that accidental
contact and the contact currently experienced is that the DGF plans for its elk population
to be partly resident on private lands rather than merely making regulatory allowance for
the occasional unintentional shift. See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 13.6-13.7 (1995).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

by plan of the DGF."
3. A New Statute-Must Strengthen Trespass Protection
New Mexico statutory and common law assert private liability for
contacts by either individuals, their real or personal property, with other
individuals, their real or personal property.' 8 Landowners can be held
accountable for the damage caused by their herds where causation can
be proven,1 except in specific circumstances where state interests
subsume private uses and require private action to serve a public pur,pose.' When, as in the case of elk regulations, the state preempts
private liability for private activities, the action causes two clear effects
on private landowners. First, the state action may expand the legal liabilities of landowners without concomitantly expanding their protection. For
example, landowners must do more to protect their pasture land from elk
depredations when the state increases the volume of those depredations.
Second, the landowner may suffer reduced ability to seek legal redress

197. The plans that 19 N.M.A.C. § 30.5 enforces do not include the option that elk will
not be resident on a given plot of private land solely based on human planning. The
regulation does not afford landowners or game managers the option to completely remove
a resident elk population. Without this regulatory option, it can only be inferred that it is
the DGF plan to have elk resident on all private lands where adequate habitat exists.
198. Two examples of this assertion are statutes which govern wild dogs and common
law nuisance doctrines which govern overhanging tree limbs. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-1-2
(1993) provides that "[i]f any dog shall kill or injure any livestock, the owner or keeper of
such dog shall be liable for all damages that may be sustained thereby." In the case of
Abbinett v. Fox, 703 P.2d 177 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985), cert quashed, 702 P.2d 1007 (N.M. 1985),
after reviewing the range of doctrines used in other states, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals concluded that "[tihe privilege of a landowner to make use of his property as he
sees fit is generally qualified by the requirement that he exercise due regard for the interests
of those who may be affected by the landowner's activities on the property." It further held,
given a finding of nuisance, that "[tlhe trial court may grant both damages for already
incurred injuries and injunctive relief to prevent future harm where there is a showing of
irreparable injury for which there is no adequate and complete remedy at law." Id. at 181-82.
199. Id. at 181.
200. See Firemen's Fund Ins., Inc. v. Tucker, 618 P.2d 894, 897 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
("the Legislature intended to protect the general public from injury by imposing liability on
governmental agencies when they fail to maintain safe public highways."). In 1965 the New
Mexico Supreme Court found that modern society demanded that cattle owners would be
liable for injuries caused on unfenced highways if the cattle were struck by passing
motorists. Grubb v. Wolfe, 408 P.2d 756 (N.M. 1965). It adopted this rule and applied a
traditional negligence standard despite the previous common law view that a landowner
could permit cattle to roam freely, even across unfenced highways. Grubb, 408 P.2d at 75859. The New Mexico Legislature responded soon after by enacting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-813(B) (Michie 1996). These new provisions shifted the burden of fencing to the state and
away from the landowners. See generallyJ.Herbert Snyder, Toward Land Use StabilityThrough
Contracts, 6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 406 (1966).
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for injuries. An example of this is that a landowner who harasses elk and
forces them onto another landowner's property is not liable for the
injuries thereby caused.2m
As an example of the first effect, consider the statutory provision
governing fencing along state highways. When New Mexico expanded its
highway system in the mid-20th century, it condemned long stretches of
narrow strips of private land. Because the condemnation of land for
highways directly affected a rancher's pasture fencing, where New
Mexico takes private land for the construction of highways, the state
accepted the liability for maintenance of the new fences.' Further, the
state provided the material for constructing the fences.2 Though the
statute benefits one group substantially,' the statute implies a duty
owed to all citizens.20 The state concluded that its social goals of
economic development and modernization, by adding and improving
roads, merited acceptance of liability for their maintenance. Propagation
of elk is a similar goal, and similarly, the decision to propagate elk puts
a substantial and new burden on a specific portion of the human population. ' The regulation notwithstanding, fencing out the elk at substantial cost is the only legal method landowners have to prevent elk
depredations.'
As an example of the second effect on landowners, consider the
inconsistency of the current regulation with trespass protection normally

201. Here, the fences were required because of the danger to the motoring public. See
Firemen's Fund Ins., Inc. 618 P.2d at 898. Notice that N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-8-13 (B)(2)
(Michie 1996) requires that the Highway Department "post proper signs along all highways
under its jurisdiction which are not fenced on both sides and which are adjacent to property
containing livestock." See also Mitchell v. Ridgway, 421 P.2d 778, 780 (N.M. 1966).
202. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-8-13(B)(1) (Michie 1996).
203. Id.
204. See Firemen's Fund Ins., 618 P.2d at 897; Mitchell v. Ridgway, 421 P.2d 778, 780
(N.M. 1966).
205. This duty is limited to preventing livestock from entering highways, not to general
negligence in constructing inadequate fencing. Lerma v. State Highway Dep't of New
Mexico, 877 P.2d 1085, 1086 (N.M. 1994) ("to protect the motoring public from wandering
livestock"); cf. Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 41 (N.M. 1990) (limiting a landowner's
duty owed to the purpose of the fence).
206. Both road development and an increased interest in wildlife propagation are
phenomena of the 20th century. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-8-13 (Michie 1978); LuND, supra
note 18, at 60-62; Harold W. Steinhoff, et al., Evolution of the Valuation of Wildlife, in VALUING
WILDLIFE 34-39 (Daniel J. Decker & Gary R. Goff, eds., 1987). To the extent that the state
actively managed elk herds prior to the 20th century, the management focused on population stabilization. The interest in dramatic expansion of herd size and of wholesale
reintroduction of species is new.
207. This is true when based on individual action. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 17-1-14 (D)
(Michie 1995). The landowner could participate in a depredation hunt, but there is no
guarantee of full exclusion of elk.
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afforded the landowner. When a lawful fence exists, private parties are
liable for trespass when their personal property (such as cattle) invades
the land of others. Because elk are presumed to be resident and
because the definition of lawful fence does not require that the fence be
elk-proof, there are two ways in which the current regulations undermine
trespass protections: first, when landowners attempt to assert liability
against other landowners whose cattle have trespassed; and second, when
landowners attempt to assert liability against the state for the trespass of
elk on private property. Proof of the trespass claim generally requires that
the defendant have intent and knowledge regarding the invasion," but
occasionally those two factors are implied by the circumstances.21 °
Consequently, the difficult issue is whether acts by elk serve as a defense
to the claim of trespass.2" Whether the elk trampling fences serves as
a defense against the claim of failure to maintain a lawful fence (and
thereby allowing trespasses to occur), the presence of state-owned elk on
private land complicate personal tort liability. Clearly the elk add to the
liability of one landowner and hinder the ability of neighboring landowners to protect themselves from trespass by cattle.
Further hindering redress, the landowner will be unable to assert
liability against the state even though the DGF manages the elk with an
understanding that they will migrate to private lands.12 A number of
208. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-16-3 (Michie 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-16-1 (Michie 1995);
Stewart v. Oberholtzer, 258 P.2d 369 (N.M. 1953); Gallegos v. Allemand, 157 P.2d 493 (N.M.
1945); Jastro v. Francis, 172 P. 1139 (N.M. 1918); but see Kinsolving v. Reed, 393 P.2d 20
(N.M. 1964) (rejecting implied contract to restrain one's cattle); Woofter v. Lincoln, 309 P.2d
622 (N.M. 1957) (requiring activity or plan for trespass damages to be recoverable in the
absence of a lawful fence).
209. Gallegos v. Allemand, 157 P.2d 493 (N.M. 1945).
210. Id. at 494, where the court noted that "it did not necessarily follow that they
'intended' that they should graze on appellee's land." This statement implies a factual
distinction; with sufficiently persuasive facts, the intent might be implied from those facts.
211. The problem is made more severe by the weak restrictions on harassment of game.
Generally, this note assumes that neighboring landowners make similar uses of neighboring
land. However valid the assumption is, a review of New Mexico law on the subject of
trespass by cattle suggests several considerations. First, many claims against ranching
landowners are brought by dissimilar use landowners. See Gallegos v. Allemand, 157 P.2d
493 (N.M. 1945) (plaintiff undergrazed his land while the defendant overgrazed his); Stewart
v. Oberholtzer, 258 P.2d 369 (N.M. 1953) (plaintiff owned a decorated residential lot while
defendant raised horses); Woofter v. Lincoln, 309 P.2d 622 (N.M. 1957) (plaintiff raised
alfalfa while defendant ran sheep); but see Kinsolving v. Reed, 393 P.2d 20 (N.M. 1964)
(plaintiff sued for rental value of forage taken from an unfenced lot by defendant's
surrounding cattle). Second, that lawful fencing is the dispositive factual issue in many of
these cases because without lawful fencing, the requirements of proof are too difficult to
overcome. Third, that even if a lawful fence existed, it is entirely unclear that damage to that
fence by elk is considered anything other than an accident of nature. This suggests that the
increased burden falls on the private landowner who suffers the trespass.
212. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180-81.
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reasons support the extension of liability to the state. The DGF intends
to use those private lands as a part of its management plan rather than
merely providing overflow capacity. Further, the state makes no effort to
restrict the movement of its elk herd, and additionally, the state limits
development on land leased from the state. 3 Because the proof of
willful conduct requires that it be specific to the claimant's property, a
claim against the DGF may be unsupported by the specific facts of the
case. However, maintaining elk herds too large to survive on public lands
and knowing that they migrate seasonally through private lands might
imply that the management was deliberate enough to incur state liability.
In a common law suit, the implied proof might suffice against a private
party. In New Mexico, it would fail because the state retains a limited
sovereign
immunity, and would need to waive it to be liable to private
2 14
parties.
C. Mandatory Modifications:Protectionfrom Shifts and Private
Appeals
The existing regulation governing compensation for landowners
is inefficient and fails to manage the burdens appropriately. Two
problematic elements of the current regulation require change. The first
is the lack of protection granted to private landowners from sudden elk
herd shifts from other private land. The second is the lack of protection
granted to landowners from the consequences of being unable to market
permits. The following section discusses these two limitations.

213. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-7-51 (Michie 1995), which limits the improvements made
on leased lands. Estimates of the cost for a mile of elk-proof fencing were as high as $3000
per mile. By limiting state-land lessees to $150 fence improvements, the state guarantees that
mixed-ownership land cannot exclude elk.
214. The New Mexico courts impose a "primary purpose test" under which the state can
be liable. The question is what "primary purpose" the statute works to achieve, and whether
the effect complained is consequent to that achievement. City of Albuquerque v. Redding,
605 P.2d 1156 (N.M. 1980). This test resulted in waiver of immunity in Firemen's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Tucker, 618 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1980) (allowing suits against the N.M. Highway Dep't).
Thus, the question would be the primary effect of the current statute or regulation, which
does not explicitly allow for liability. The courts will construe waiver of sovereign immunity
where the purpose is protection of the public, because "[the direction indicated ... in
interpreting the Tort Claims Act has been toward a liberal, rather than a narrow,
construction of the Act." Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 618 P.2d at 896. Consequently,
the question is whether 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 (1995) protects the public, and the answer is that
it does not. Without this public-protection purpose, construed waiver of sovereign immunity
is unlikely, and the landowner cannot maintain a suit for damages against the state.
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1. Protecting Landowners from Elk Herd Shifts
Shifts of elk herds among private lands are the result of a failure
to manage the incentives to keep elk on an owner's private land. The
regulation fails because it does not account for higher financial returns
available to landowners without resident elk. Within any regulatory
framework which relies on having elk resident on private lands, when
there is the opportunity for a landowner to derive more income without
resident elk, the regulatory system will fail to achieve its goals because
the landowner will always have a limited incentive to shift the elk from
the land. Under 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5., this incentive is particularly high for
small ranches. Any modifications to the regulation must account for and
proactively manage this incentive.
These incentives pose significant risks for the wildlife. The consequences to the elk of being panicked and harassed from tract to tract can
include death or reduced reproduction. Thus, it must be illegal to harass
elk in any way."' s Other states have adopted strict prohibitions on
harassment. Alone, these prohibitions are inadequate because they do not
prevent the injury to private property or to wildlife. It is imperative that
the other motives for causing shifts in wildlife populations also be
accounted for within the regulatory system in order to appropriately
manage their consequences.

215. One solution to excessive non-fatal harassment of wildlife is to criminalize the
attempted act. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-102(a)(vii) (1991) which defines'taking game as
to "hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess, or attempt to hunt,
pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess." This does not describe the
full range of methods available to a landowner. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-102(24)
(West 1990), defining harassment of game as "to unlawfully endanger, worry, impede,
annoy, pursue, disturb, molest, rally, concentrate, harry, chase, herd, or torment wildlife."
New Mexico does not substantially define harassment of wildlife. General regulatory powers
governing harassment are granted in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-2 (Michie 1978), which states
"[tihe game animals ... herein defined shall be protected and hunting, taking, capturing,
killing, or possession or attempt to hunt, take, capture or kill of any or all species named
herein shall be regulated by the state game commission."
Consistent with that provision, New Mexico grants endangered and threatened species
similar protection, stating that "'take' or 'taking' means to harass, hunt, capture or kill any
wildlife or attempt to do so." With either the broad or narrow definitions, the statutes err
because they focus on the act of harassment and not the indicators and consequences of
harassment. In doing so they protect only the victims of one kind of harassment, and in
doing so, protect only one victim of the harassment. The consequences to a recipient
landowner are significant. Downed fences, injured cattle and damaged riparian areas are
all plausible results of a large panicked herd's movement. Correspondingly, recipient
landowners must have some role in determining when an act of harassment occurs, if only
because they are certain to have practical proof of it.
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Because 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 fails to manage these economic
incentives, there are two specific proposals for remedying the problem.
First, protection must be given to the small landowners' interests to
ensure that the regulation provides the desired incentives to constructively manage wildlife in a cooperative relationship with the DGF. Any
landowner who in good faith files a valid and proven depredation claim
must be guaranteed either a permit or recovery from the state. 6 This
ensures that even the smallest landowners have incentive to report elk
depredations. Further, it guarantees that the marginal ranches are not
barred from recovering their losses and maintains the landowners'
opportunity to realize their economic expectations.217
Second, the state must maintain seasonal and perhaps daily elk
measurement. Elk move frequently, and move long distances daily and
seasonally."' They do not generally stay in the same area over long
periods,2 19 and they panic in groups.' During a given year, elk travel
in herds of varying sizes." This could affect a landowner's burden over
the course of a year. Thus, a landowner's burden cannot be measured at
a single time of day in a single season. More thorough measurement of
elk habits and populations is required to provide for a stable population
of elk as it grows and hunting controls its population. Further, consistent
and regular measurements would reduce the current incentive to chase
off elk after initial verification and subsequent hunts.

216. The incentive must be to report depredations across the GMU. The more accurately
all landowners report depredations, the more accurately the privately-borne costs of wildlife
depredations may be estimated. The requirement of compensation does not require
substantial payments and does not require disproportionate payments.
217. This note suggests that landowners formulate economic expectations annually.
Sudden changes in elk populations interfere with these expectations. Further, the amount
of herd shift interference with these expectations is proportional to the size of the ranch.
This is another form of the marginal ranch problem: a single elk displacing a single cow
matters a great deal more to a ranch which can only support one cow. The supporting land
might be inadequate to merit a permit under the current regulations. As noted above, the
only remaining methods for remediating the problem are illegal. No regulatory system
should put such small landowners in a position to be tempted to violate the laws of the
State.
218. BOYD, supra note 125, at 18.
219. Id.
220. Id. This is especially important for cases of harassment, because elk that panic in
groups also trample fences. The closer the elk measurements approximate the various sizes
of these groups the better the compensation will match the injury suffered. Panicking of elk
is a serious factor when considering the smallest landowner's burden: even if the elk do not
remain for a season or longer, trampling alone could do proportionally more damage to a
small landowner's ranch.
221. Id. at 18-20.
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Elk-proof fencing poses the largest risk to elk populations after
hunters.m Within its broad responsibility for managing the elk species,
the DGF should have limited oversight over fence installation plans to
ensure that there is no substantial disruption of species behaviors caused
by unilateral action. The landowner should apply for a permit to erect the
fence,m and the permit should include a certification by the landowner
that the land suffered no elk depredations for over a year. With this
certification, the landowner assumes the cost of fencing, and the claim of
no depredations is presumed to be valid.'
The DGF should develop a comprehensive plan for establishing
the ideal levels and locations of elk in New Mexico. That plan should
describe the locations of the desired potential elk-proof fences. If the DGF
adopts the privately-proposed fence as part of its long term plans for
shifting the migratory patterns of elk within the state, the DGF and the
landowner should share the cost of the fencing. The DGF and the landowner should divide the difference between the cost of the elk-proof
fence and the cost of the elk-permeable fence' that the landowner
could raise instead. The landowner should be immune to challenge of
this plan, because the fence is consistent with a state-generated plan. The
DGF retains the option to not fence the property with elk-proof fencing.
Because the result of this choice would be continued elk depredations,

222. See BOYD supra note 125, at 18, where he states that "Rocky Mountain Elk incur relatively large prenatal and postnatal losses. This apparently is due in large measure to
restrictive forage conditions on winter ranges and, to a lesser degree, to disease and
predation."
223. This provision should not govern non-elk-proof fences. Raising permeable fences
poses no significant risk to elk and placement of these fences is a ranch-management
decision of which the DGF should play no part. Nor should this provision govern elk-proof
fences that are outside the geographical limits of the DGF comprehensive elk habitat and
fencing plans. The DGF's authority extends only to the elk and their likely and desired locations. A landowner wishing to raise elk-proof fencing outside the parameters of the plan
should not fall within DGF regulations solely because the fencing in question might impact
elk habitat at some future time.
224. This presumption should be rebuttable. Either interested private parties or DGF
should be permitted to challenge the presumption when the permit is issued. The compliance with DGF species plans for that GMU would make the fence permissible.
225. This notion rests on the dual-user principle. The idea is that both users derive
inappropriate to shift the costs of fencing wholly to the
benefit from the fence, and it 'is
private party. Colorado statutory provisions provide that the Colorado Division of Wildlife
should furnish "sufficient and appropriate damage prevention materials" to landowners, or
in the alternative, expose itself to liability for damages caused by wildlife. COLO.REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-3-103 (West 1990). The statute conditions the landowner's right to recovery for
such damages in a number of ways. Id. That same provision requires the landowner to use
and maintain the materials provided and to limit fees charged to hunters for access to
private lands. Id. at § 33-3-103(d)-(g). Quite dearly, the statute allocates the burdens of
preventing depredations between the parties.
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opting not to fence should result in annual compensation to the landowner' for the opportunity cost of not fully using the land for cattle
while the depredations continue. '
If the DGF opted to pay for fencing, the landowner should be
under an affirmative duty to care for the fence. Failure to do so would
bar depredations recovery by the landowner. Further, failure to raise the
fence within a reasonable period would be deemed a waiver of liability
for future depredations by elk. The DGF should provide written notice
to the landowner of its intent to provide fencing costs. An adequate time
period must be given to allow the landowner to make any necessary
financial adjustments.
Under current regulations, the landowner may not contract with
DGF to leave a portion of deeded lands for elk in exchange for exclusion
of elk on other portions of the lands.m This type of ecological and economic compromise encourages development of a wildlife industry while
limiting the direct invasion damages to the landowner. In effect, the
landowner agrees to allow the DGF an easement to use part of the
private lands for public purposes with the understanding that the
remaining wholly private lands will not be invaded by resident wildlife.
Where the landowner grants this form of easement, the DGF should pay
for the elk-proof fencing. The lands used in this type of scheme should
be selected in accordance with the DGF comprehensive plans for the
species.
The DGF should provide the landowner the option either to
accept direct monetary compensation or accept permits in exchange for
elk depredations. These permits function as access permits and licenses
for possession of wildlife.m The access granted by permits should be
ranch-only, but the permits should be transferable within GMUs for use
on other ranches. Landowners should have the full right to exclude
hunters from their property and the freedom to limit damage by hunters
to their lands. When the landowner accepts the permits, they become
private property, and the landowner assumes liability for recovering

226. The compensation should be for single-season displacement damage, and no more.
The DGF should not be required to insure the landowner against future losses or damage
to the cattle. In other instances, this is the replacement cost of the cattle.
227. This rests on the principle that the elk displace cattle directly. The landowner would
be required to file a depredation claim, describing the depredations, the location, and causes
of depredation requiring compensation.
228. More precisely, the landowner must provide copies of deeds to the DGF showing
title to all lands. it is unclear that a landowner can exempt a portion of lands from the consideration of total private deeded acres on the principle that the land cannot carry elk
because of exclusionary fencing. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.4-8.5 (1995).
229. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180; see generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-103 (West

1990).
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adequate compensation. If the landowner opts not to participate in the
market for elk permits, the landowner recovers only the cost of elk
displacement: the access fees arranged between hunter and landowner are
not limited by the state.
B. Modifications of the Appeals Process
The appeals process requires substantial modification. Changes
should include limiting the use of discretion, expanding the issues
raisable on appeal, including inter-season hunts, and ensuring quick
appeals. The need for regularity in the system is key to producing
consistent results. This rigidity does not foreclose discretion on the part
of local officers, but merely ensures that the use of discretion is consistent
with the state policy objectives.
As discussed above, broad discretion on the part of local DGF
officers inhibits achievement of the state policy governing elk. By
allowing broad discretion, the current regulatory system evades
accountability for its effects on landowners. The system provides variable
results and inconsistent compensation to landowners. Discretion in the
permit allocation process must be limited by specific conditions and clear
factors in the determination of who receives additional permits, and
when. Making the discretionary process more procedural than political
would allow the DGF to review GMUs for their compliance with the
general goals. It would also allow the public to observe the DGF
compliance with its policy interests.
On the other hand, some elements of the current regulation are
too rigid. When revising the regulations, landowners should not be
limited to a single hunting season for their permit-based compensation.
Hunts serve a number of purposes,' not the least of which is reducing
the elk burden on a landowner's property. This reduction is the purpose
behind the special depredation hunts currently allowed on state
lands.' This purpose is a desirable one and should be applied to private lands throughout the year. Since the sale of permits is key to
compensation of landowners," special hunting seasons on private
lands should be allowed in instances where the hunt was unsuccessful

230. See generally Gonzales, supra note 3 at 179-81; Dale A. Wade, Economics of Wildlife
Production and Damage Control on Private Lands, in VALUING WILDLIFE 154, 158 (Daniel J.

Decker & Gary R. Goff, eds., 1987).
231. See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 8.2 (1995).
232. Gonzales, supra note 3, at 180.
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within the GMU and the landowners received little compensation.'
Landowners should be allowed to petition DGF for a special hunt, and
the denial of a hunt should be appealable through the ordinary appeals
process.
The speed of the appeals process is key to providing useful
compensation to the landowner. Currently, the only deadlines the DGF
uses are those it imposes on itself and on the landowner filing the
appeal. 3 Functionally, correction of error in allocation of permits is
limited by the hunting season, since permits are issued annually' for
a specific hunt. Further, errors in allocation cannot be corrected because
permits are deemed an annual compensation to the landowners.' 7 and
additional compensatory seasons are unavailable. Existing deadlines do
not ensure a speedy answer from DGF because they only serve to limit
the use of permits by citizens. Other states instituted administrative deadlines which produce presumptive results favoring the landowner.'
While the landowner must still provide proof of the claim,' by providing independent administrative deadlines, the arrangement removes the

233. In addition, the hunting season could be extended during the fall. This sort of discretion, for a single purpose, with clearly defined conditions would be desirable to achieve
the state policy objectives. The two regulations, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 and 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 do
not work together. The first remains consistent with its goal, while the second undermines
the DGF's incentive to encourage the first because the safety-valve depredation hunt will
always be available. Gonzales quotes Aldo Leopold as instructing: "Recognize the
landowner as the custodian of the public game on all private land, protect him from the
irresponsible shooter, and compensate him for putting his land in productive condition."
19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 is inconsistent with the first and last of those three directives. The first
because no incentive exists for the landowner to care for the wildlife if no benefit will
accrue, the last because it prohibits compensation for the landowner. 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 § 8.2
(1995).
234. See Landowner Agreement, supra note 39, at 2.
235. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9 (1995).
236. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.1 (1995).
237. Moreover, permits are deemed a single compensation for the aggregate damages
of the resident elk. See Gonzales, supranote 3, at 181, where he generalizes that "landowners
see authorizations as a compensatory vehicle for the recovery of losses.... Authorizations
provide a vehicle for recovering those expenses caused by wildlife." Since the authorizations
are available only once a year, and the authorizations are not for prospective damages, the
only interpretation remaining is that they serve to compensate for the annualized aggregate
damages.
238. See COLw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-103(2)(e) (West 1990); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1901(c) (Michie 1991).
239. See CoLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-104(3) (West 1990); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-901
(a) (Michie 1991).
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burden from the landowner. 4' The burden of initiating a challenge
must be borne by the landowner, and the burden of producing a speedy
response by the DGF.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a recent poll, the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish
that
58 percent of those polled believe that landowners should
found
receive some form of compensation." Some 40 percent of those polled
thought that elk caused 'some' damage 42 It is that 'some' damage
caused by elk that forms the basis for the Department of Game and
Fish's annual allocation of thousands of landowner permits. If that
'some' damage is enough to merit the transfer of thousands of
untaxable permits and licenses each year, surely that 'some' damage is
enough to merit allocating the permits correctly.
The current regulatory system of allocating elk permits to
landowners is inefficient. It creates disincentives to positive management
and contradicts the doctrine the State Game Commission relied on in
creating the regulation. It provides transfers of money to ranches, with
a decided preference for transfers to larger ranches, which marginalizes
small ranches and consequently excludes them from the compensatory
process which 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 creates. Consideration of other states'
practices suggests a broad range of possible administrative schemes, some
of which are particularly appropriate for New Mexico. The proposed
statute in Appendix A works to correct the flaws in the current regulatory structure. Consequently, the author strongly advocates adoption of the
proposed statutory scheme.

240. A finding of no impact is distinguishable from no response. Where a level of
appeals finds the information provided would leave the formula allocation unchanged, that
level of appeal is terminated without prejudice against the DGF. Under the current
regulatory regime, the deadline burden falls on the landowner and not on the DGF. The
current regime could delay response to the appeal and thus, allow the landowner's claim
to become moot. This particular result is dearly undesirable.
241. How New Mexicans Feel About Wildlife Depredation (N.M. Dep't of Game and
Fish, 1966) (on file with author).
242. Id.
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Table 1
Acreage Distributions for G.M.U. Residents Allocated Permits
This table lists all Game Management Units for which at least one
resident applied for and received landowner compensation permits. The
table divides the total number of Game Management Unit ranches by
eight acreage categories. As the reader will see, the large majority of
ranches receiving permits are under 750 acres.

Unit #

1-50

51-100

2
4
5
6
7
9
10
15
16
17
21
34
36
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

0
21
8
34
0
1
1
10
10
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
3
3
0
1
0
0
0

2
16
7
40
0
0
0
9
10
0
0
4
0
0
3
0
1
2
0
7
8
10
0
0
0
0
0

101250
2
27
25
46
1
1
1
12
17
0
2
8
2
12
4
0
6
11
4
16
18
9
0
3
0
0'
0

ACRES
251751750
1500
5
48
49
36
6
3
9
28
13
2
0
12
4
12
3
0
8
7
17
20
13
7
0
2
0
11
0

5
31
27
5
2
2
6
22
7
4
1
2
0
1
2
0
11
4
5
1
3
2
2
3
0
8
0

15013000

30006000

6000 +

Unit
Total

3
36
15
5
1
2
9
10
3
7
1
2
3
3
5
0
3
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0
1
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1

25
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17
32
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67
15
4
32
14
31
26
1
36
29
31
46
48
36
9
28
3
42
3
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Table 2
Selected G.M.U. Acreage and Permit Type Distributions
This table lists certain game management units and shows their total
permit type allocations for all ranch sizes. The New Mexico Department
of Game and Fish uses three permit types: bull elk (M); cow elk (F); and
immature or E-Bow elk (E). The table divides the ranches into eight
acreage categories. As the reader will see, there is a significant preference
for the inequitable allocation of bull elk permits to the largest ranches.
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1. Note that this quantity is significantly inflated by a single ranch which anomalously
took 400 cow and 200 bull permits, the reverse of the pattern for the remainder of the unit
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Appendix A
Proposed Statute
Title. This act shall be known as the "Landowner Elk Damage
I.
Compensation Act."
II.
Purpose. It is the purpose of this act to:
A. Provide a mechanism, consistent with the biological needs of
wildlife, to compensate private landowners for damage done
to their property, real, personal, or otherwise, by elk managed
by the State of New Mexico;
B. Ensure that landowners of properties of all sizes are compensated equitably for damage caused by elk, and to ensure that
every ranch receives meaningful compensation for that
damage;
C. Ensure that the management of wildlife responds to public
interest by involving the public in setting its wildlife goals;
and
D. Ensure that landowners have efficient, speedy, and effective
recourse to obtain answer for their complaints regarding
licensing and permitting decisions, applicable to the landowner, through an internal administrative appeals process.
III.
Not Within Purposes. It is not within the purposes of this act to
provide a private cause of action against the State of New Mexico
for damage caused by elk. Nor is it within the purposes to create
a cause of action against private citizens to recover for damage
caused by privately-owned elk.
IV.
Definitions. As used throughout the act, the following terms are
defined as follows.
A. "Harassment." Harassment of wildlife by private parties is any
intentional act tending to annoy, bother, disturb, arouse,
frighten, scare, panic, rally, intimidate, or terrify wildlife
managed by the State of New Mexico. Harassment is non-fatal
to the wildlife.
B. 'Taking." Taking of wildlife by private parties is any intentional act which does, or significantly contributes to the
proximate demise of wildlife managed by the State of New
Mexico. Taking may occur indirectly pursuant to negligent
acts having harmful consequences for the animals. Taking is
fatal to the wildlife.
C. "Measure." The measure of a wildlife population is its census
total as determined by the Department of Game and Fish
pursuant to visual observation and estimation through other
means. Measurement of herd populations shall not be
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exclusively deductively made, and must include visual
observation within a given Game Management Unit made on
a bi or triennial basis.
D. "Plan." The Plan is the regulatory plan promulgated by the
New Mexico Department of Game and Fish and the State
Game Commission consistent with the provisions contained
herein.
E. "Depredations." Depredations by wildlife are damage to
private property caused by wildlife managed by the State of
New Mexico. Depredations, herein, are used to mean physical
destruction of private property, as well as indirect damages
which limit the productivity of private land. Both types of
injury may be compensated through use of the Plan.
F. "Inspections." Inspections, for the purposes of this statute
mean physical inspections of private property to estimate
damage, made in-person by an agent of the Department of
Game and Fish. Where helpful and possible, verification
should be made in the company of the private landowner.
Verification of destructive damage, such as downed fencing
or damaged structures may be conducted through recordings,
photographic or otherwise, which clearly demonstrate
significant and unique physical features which identify the
property in question as belonging to the landowner.
G. "Permit." A qualifying landowner will be allocated elk license
permits which allow the landowner to purchase elk licenses
at a modest fee. These permits are transferrable among private
individuals and are not controlled by license-possession
requirements which limit a possessor to a limited quantity of
licenses per calendar year.
H. "Department." The Department is the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish and any subsidiary administrative
agencies obliged to manage the wildlife of New Mexico.
1. "Gender Ratio." For each Game Management Unit in which
the Department allocates elk permits, the Department shall
determine a Gender Ratio which governs the ratio between
the genders (Bull and Cow) that the total elk population is
reduced within the Game Management Unit. The determination of this ratio shall rely on all relevant statistics, such as
degree of depredations suffered, population goals, ratio of
public to private land, hunting successes of the two genders,
and any other statistics that the Department finds relevant.
Authorization for Promulgating Regulations. The appropriate New
Mexico regulatory agencies are hereby given authority to promulgate regulations consistent with these provisions. The provisions
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contained herein are to be viewed as guidance in the promulgation
of those regulations.
A. Inspections and Duties. The Department and landowner
should comply with the following provisions as applicable to
the Department or landowner.
1. Duty to Measure Wildlife Populations. It is the duty of
the Department to measure the elk population within the
State of New Mexico on an annual basis. Reference to
prior year hunting success and landowner participation
are relevant concerns, but are inadequate to measure the
elk population. The Department may not rely on previous
depredations claims by landowners as a presumptively
accurate measurement of elk depredations.
2. Duty to Inspect Landowner Claims. It is the duty of the
Department to inspect and verify all depredation claims
by landowners.
3. Duty to Report Changes in Population. Where a landowner applies files a depredation claim, and the Department verifies the claim, the landowner is under a duty to
report significant changes in that population, especially
large increases in population. The Department shall
inspect and verify these claims, and account for them
when allocating permits.
4. Duty to Obtain Permission. Whenever the Department
wishes to conduct inspections, the Department must:
a. Provide 48 hours notice, oral or otherwise, of the
planned inspection time;
b. Request permission from the landowner to enter the
private property upon arrival at the private property;
c. Choose an alternative time recommended by the
landowner if the time requested is either inconvenient or likely to produce under-representation of the
actual elk population on the private land; and
d. Allow the landowner to escort the Department's
representative(s) to the site(s) where depredations
occur.
5. Duty to Cooperate. The landowner is under a duty to
cooperate, whenever reasonably possible, with the
Department in the inspections. If the landowner fails to
allow access, or prevents inspection by the Department,
the landowner will not be eligible for landowner permits
for the subsequent hunting season.
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Allocation of Permits to Landowners Suffering Depredations. The
allocation of permits to landowners suffering quantified depredations shall be conditioned on the following provisions.
A. Minimum Bull Permits. When allocating permits to landowners, the first permit issued to any landowner shall be a Bull
permit.
B. Equality in Distribution of Further Permits. The allocation of
all further permits to the depredated landowners within a
Game Management Unit shall be governed by the gender
ratio. Consequently, the ratio shall be applied equally to all
ranches within that Game Management Unit.
C. Discretionary Permits Distribution. Any discretionary permits
issued by the Department shall be issued consistent within the
following guidelines:
1. Public Information. The number, gender, and recipient
ranches of discretionary permits shall be made public
information;
2. Equal Ratios. The allocation of discretionary permits shall
be distributed consistent with the gender ratio for the
Game Management Unit;
3. Documented Justification. The agent allocating discretionary permits shall provide a documented justification for
allocating the permit. The documents shall be filed in the
Department of Game and Fish, and the public shall have
access to those documents upon written request.
4. Consistent With the Needs of the Wildlife. All discretionary permits must comply with the goal of maintaining a
viable population on the land. Eradication of elk presence
within a region is not a justification for discretionary
permits. Mere landowner displeasure with an allocation
is insufficient as a justification.
Seasons and Depredation Hunts. The Department may extend
hunting seasons for specific Game Management Units for several
reasons. Similarly, depredation hunts may be held for those
reasons, and for others enumerated herein. These two extensions
or modifications of existing seasons are conditioned in a number
of ways.
A. Extended Hunting Seasons for Game Management Units. The
Department may extend hunting seasons for specific Game
Management Units conditioned on the following premises:
1. Purpose is to Compensate Landowners. Where landowners in the G.M.U. do not substantially achieve population
reduction objectives, the Department may extend the
season for that G.M.U. That extension is only to allow the
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landowners who failed to harvest elk to do so. No
additional permits for this season may be allocated.
2. To Bring Game Management Unit into Compliance with
Plan. Where the Department has developed the Plan, and
established population goals, fencing plans, and land-use
plans, the Department may extend hunting seasons to
bring specific Game Management Units into compliance
with the Plan. In such cases, a majority of landowners
suffering depredations within the Game Management
Unit need not approve the extension.
3. Majority Required. For such a season extension to
compensate landowners, a majority of landowners within
the Game Management Unit who suffer elk depredations
must consent to the extension. If a majority is not in favor
of the extension, it cannot be made.
4. Only an Extension of Hunting Season. Such extensions
cannot be construed to allow the Department to hold
additional hunting seasons. An extension must be held
immediately following the regular hunting season.
5. Profit to the Landowner. When the Department extends
the hunting season for a Game Management Unit, any
profit or access fee the landowner wishes to charge for
access or transfer of the permit remains with the landowner and does not revert to the State of New Mexico.
B. Depredation Hunts. Individual landowner property may be
granted authority to hold depredation hunts where certain
conditions are met.
I. Population Changes. Where the resident elk population
on a specific property increases substantially, the Department and landowner may agree to hold depredation
hunts, rather than waiting until permits are allocated.
2. No Consensus for Extending G.M.U. Hunting Season.
Where the Game Management Unit landowners' consensus vote denies an extension of a hunting season, the
Department may authorize depredation hunts on individual properties within those Game Management Units.
3. Specific Management Goals. Where the Department and
private landowners consent to designate land as elk-free,
pursuant to other agreements, or to raise elk-impermeable fences consistent with the Plan, the Department may
conduct elk depredation hunts to eliminate resident elk
populations.
4. No Profit to the Landowner. A landowner using a
depredation hunt may not charge fees for access, use, or
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traverse of land pursuant to the depredation hunt. A
landowner may not charge for the permits used in a
depredation hunt. A landowner may opt to use all
permits for a depredation hunt personally. The carcasses
from a depredation hunt remain the property of the State
of New Mexico.
VIII. Appeals Process. The landowner, and the public generally, may
appeal certain administrative decisions rendered by the Department, subject to specific controls described herein. The landowner,
the public, and the Department operate under certain obligations
during this appeals process. The Department shall create an
appeals process consistent with these provisions.
A. Grounds for Appeal. The following shall be included as
grounds for appeal of a Department decision.
1. No Permits Allocated by Formula. If a landowner applies
for, and the Department denies, elk permits for the
season, the landowner may appeal this decision. The
Department shall consider evidence of permits allocated
to other ranches, similarly situated within the Game
Management Unit, in its decision. Where the Department
grants discretionary permits to other ranches within the
Game Management Unit, it shall be prima facie evidence
that a landowner suffering depredations should receive
a permit. The Department may rebut this presumption.
2. Mathematical Error. Where the Department commits a
mistake in its calculation and allocation of permits, the
landowner may present this error and if borne out on review, the Department shall correct the mistake. Similarly,
the landowner may appeal any allocation based on an
incorrect factual premise used by the Department when
it allocates permits within the Game Management Unit.
3. Gender Ratio Inconsistency. Where the landowner
receives an allocation of permits, and the gender of those
permits is significantly different from the Gender Ratio
established by the Department for the Game Management
Unit, the landowner may appeal this. Similarly, the
landowner may raise an appeal where other landowners
within the Game Management Unit receive permits
inconsistent with the Gender Ratio determined by the
Department.
4. Failure to Grant Discretionary Permits. Where the landowner applies for, and the Department denies, a claim for
discretionary permits, the landowner may appeal this
decision. This appeal shall only be valid if there were
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other discretionary permits granted within the Game
Management Unit.
5. Appeal of Plan. At its annual review of the contents of
the Plan, the Department shall allow interested parties to
request a reconsideration of the Plan. A request for reconsideration must be based on one or more of the following
criteria:
a. Significant public interest in increasing, or decreasing, the amount of elk managed by the state. A
request for reconsideration may be accompanied by
petitions or other collected statements of community
desires; and
b. Erroneous understanding of the elk, their population,
or the impact on private lands. Any erroneous fact
which the Department relies upon in designing, or
modifying, the Plan may be presented in a request
for reconsideration. Parties may also demonstrate
that the desired elk population may be managed in
a way which impacts private land less.
B. Obligations of the Department and Individuals. The obligations of the individuals and the Department, during the
appeals process, are the following.
1. Individual Obligations.
a. Timeliness. If the landowner wishes to raise an
appeal based on any of the grounds described above,
it must be made in a timely fashion.
Initial Permit Allocation Offer. The landowner
(1)
may raise an appeal up to twenty (20) days
from the postmark on the initial permit allocation offer made by the Department.
Internal Appeals. The landowner must raise
(2)
an appeal of an internal appeals decision
within five (5) days of the receipt of the
preyious internal appeals decision.
(3)
Appeal During Public Meetings. A landowner
wishing to appeal to be heard during a public
meeting shall have fifteen (15) days from the
last internal appeal stage to file the claim.
b. "Good Faith. The landowner appealing an administrative decision shall operate on a good faith belief in
the validity of the claim. Failure to do so shall be
grounds for barring the landowner from receipt of
permits for the next hunting season.
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Department Obligations.
a. Timeliness. The Department shall review any appeal
in a timely fashion. These appeals shall be reviewed
in accordance with the following guidelines.
(1)
Administrative Record Appeals. During any
stage of internal review, the Department shall
provide an answer within five (5) working
days, or before the beginning of the next
hunting season, which ever is earlier.
(2)
Public Meeting Appeals. During any stage of
public review, the Department shall provide
an answer within thirty (30) days, or before
the beginning of the next hunting season,
which ever is earlier.
b. Documentation. For each stage of review, the Department shall provide written opinions justifying its
affirmance or change of previous administrative
decisions. This written record may serve as the basis
for a landowner's appeal, and is subject to appeal
independent of the substantive merits of the
landowner's claim.
(1)
Public Meetings. For every stage of review
held during meetings which the public may
attend, the Department shall conduct the
meeting as if it were quasi-judicial in nature.
For any review held during public meetings,
the Department need not supply written
opinions to the landowner as a predicate to
deciding the merit of the landowner's complaint, but shall provide one if requested to
do so.
c. Presumption of Validity. The landowner's appeal
claim shall be presumed to be valid, if presented to
the Department in accordance with these guidelines.
This presumption shall only affect claims which meet
the Department's requirements for document production, and which are filed in a timely fashion. This
presumption shall only affect claims which the
Department fails to act on in a timely fashion. Where
one stage of review fails to complete its review in a
timely fashion, it shall be the duty of the officer(s) of
the next stage of review to make the calculations and
allocate permits accordingly, without regard to the
truth of the landowner's claim.
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The Coordinated Elk Plan. The Department shall create a Coordinated Elk Plan which describes the state-wide goals for the populations and locations of Elk within the State of New Mexico. The
Plan shall meet the following criteria.
A. State-Wide and Local Target Populations. The Plan shall
describe the overall State-wide elk population goals and the
population goals for each Game Management Unit in which
elk are to exist. These population targets shall set long-range
population targets, in addition to annual intermediary
population targets.
B. Impact on Other Managed Species. For all other species of
game which the Department manages, the Plan shall consider
the impact of elk populations on their populations, their
habitat, and locations within the State of New Mexico.
C. Migratory Patterns. The Plan shall clearly describe the
migratory patterns of the elk managed by the State of New
Mexico. Care shall be taken to avoid interfering with these
patterns, except where desirable, for other reasons, such as an
interest in eliminating minor and insufficient elk populations
from certain regions of the State of New Mexico.
D. Preference for Management of Elk on State Land. Wherever
practicable, the Department and the Plan shall manage the elk
of New Mexico on public, rather than private, lands. This
shall only be construed as a preference between locations
otherwise equal in benefit to the State of New Mexico. If
challenged, substantial discretion shall be given to the
administrative determination of elk herd requirements.
E. Minimized Impact on Private Landowners. When considering
the impacts of elk populations, the Plan shall choose the
locations for elk which minimize the burden on private
landowners caused by elk. This minimization standard shall
only be used when there are two options, otherwise equal, for
managing the elk.
F. Respect Private Land-Management Decisions. The Plan shall
not assume that all private land-uses are equal. Where lands
are expressly used for elk or wildlife, either to raise, harvest,
or protect, the Plan shall include this in its calculations. Where
the lands cannot be accessed by elk, the Plan shall consider
this as well.
Cost-Sharing of Elk-Proof Fencing. Where the private landowner
desires to raise elk- proof fencing to protect private land from elk
depredations, the Department shall have limited authority to
supervise this plan. This authority shall be consistent with these
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provisions. Further, the actual compensation due a landowner for
such fencing shall be governed by these requirements.
A. If Fence is Not Within the Plan. The Department shall have no
authority to manage fences which are not within the Plan's
long-range population goals for region and- size. Where a
fence exists, the Department may not require its removal.
1. Elk-Permeable Fences. Even within the short-range goals
of the Plan, the Department may not exercise any authority over the use of elk-permeable fences.
B. If Fence is Consistent with the Plan. If the proposed elk-proof
fence is consistent with the Plan's long-range population
goals, the Department may use it as part of the Plan. Where
the landowner desires to raise an elk-proof fence, the following provisions shall govern:
1. Permitting. The Department shall give, or deny, the
landowner the authority to raise an elk-proof fence. This
permission shall only be granted when the landowner
provides a written (including a map describing the property and proposed fencing) description of the property
and the fencing plan.
2. Fencing Allowed. Where the Department opts to allow
the elk-proof fencing, the Department shall share the
costs of the fencing with the private landowner.
a. Fence Along the Plan's Border. Where the proposed
fence would fence along the border defined by the
Plan, the Department shall always allow the landowner to raise the fence.
(1) Plan Amendments. At its annual review of the
Plan, the Department shall amend the Plan to
explicitly allow for such fences to exist.
b. Department Discretion in Accepting Landowner
Claims. Where the Department allows the elk-proof
fencing, the Department may compensate the landowner directly for half of the following costs:
(1) Cost of Labor. The difference between the cost
of raising elk-permeable fences and the cost of
raising elk-proof fences shall be compensable;
(2)
Cost of Fencing Materials. The difference between the cost of fencing materials for elkpermeable fences and the cost of fencing
materials for the elk-proof fencing shall be
compensable.
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Department Refusal of Claim. The Department may
refuse to compensate the landowner for the claimed
costs for reasons including:
Failure to Minimize Costs. If the landowner
(1)
fails to minimize the expenses associated with
raising the elk-proof fences, the Department
shall not be forced to compensate the landowner;
Outside of the Plan. If the fencing is outside
(2)
the reach of the Plan, the landowner may not
be compensated for the costs of the fencing.
d. Department May Supply Labor or Materials. Where
the Department will deny a landowner claim for
compensation for raised fencing, the Department
may opt to supply the landowner with the fencing
materials, or may opt to raise the elk-proof fencing
itself. In such a case, the Department shall not owe
compensation to the landowner.
Fencing Permit Denied. Where the Department denies the
landowner the permit to raise elk-proof fencing. this shall
be prima facie proof of elk depredations on private land.
The Department shall have the following administrative
options at its discretion:
a. Offer of Permits. The Department may offer the
landowner sufficient permits to compensate the
landowner for depredations suffered;
b. Direct Financial Compensation. The Department may
make direct financial compensation to the landowner;
c. Condemnation of Private Land. The Department may
condemn the private land consistent with other
provisions of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated;
and
d. Option to Raise the Fence Itself. The Department
may opt to raise the fence itself, without reference to
the landowner.
Coordination of Fencing With Other Species' Needs.
Where the Department determines that an elk-proof fence
is consistent with the Coordinated Elk Plan, for the
landowner to receive compensation, the Department must
affirmatively determine that the fencing does not conflict
with the habitat and migrational requirements of other
protected species.
c.

3.

4.

1088

XI.
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Severability. If any of the above provisions are found inconsistent
with the Constitutions of the United States or of New Mexico, the
violative provisions shall be severable from the remainder of the
Act.
BRIAN THOMAS

